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Abstract
Theory of Mind Measurements and Mechanisms:
An Investigation of Construct Validity and Cognitive Processes in Theory of Mind Tasks
by
Ester Navarro Garcia
Claremont Graduate University: 2021
Understanding the perspectives of others is a critical skill. Theory of mind (ToM) is an
essential ability for social competence and communication, and it is necessary for understanding
behaviors that differ from our own (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Although all individuals
possess a ToM to varying degrees, bilinguals are especially adept to perspective-taking. Research
has reported that bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM tasks (e.g., Goetz, 2003; RubioFernandez & Glucksberg, 2012). However, the mechanisms underlying this effect are unclear.
Studying individual differences in ToM performance between bilinguals and monolinguals can
help explain these mechanisms. Yet this promising area of research faces an important challenge:
the lack of psychometric research on ToM measurement. Recent research suggests that tests that
measure the ToM construct might not be as reliable as previously thought (Warnell & Redcay,
2019). This hinders the interpretation of experimental and correlational findings and puts into
question the validity of the ToM construct. This dissertation addresses these two questions
empirically to improve our understanding of what constitutes ToM. Study 1 examines the
structure of ToM, crystallized intelligence (Gc), and fluid intelligence (Gf) to understand (a)
whether ToM constitutes a construct separate from other cognitive abilities and (b) to explore
whether tasks of ToM present adequate construct validity. For this, three confirmatory factor
analyses (CFAs) were conducted. The results demonstrated that a model with three latent factors

(ToM, Gf and Gc) did not adequately fit the data and was not significantly different from a
model with only two latent factors (ToM-Gf and Gc). In addition, an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) showed that two of the ToM tasks loaded onto a Gf factor whereas one of the tasks loaded
onto a third factor by itself. Finally, an exploratory network analysis (NMA) was conducted to
observe relationships among the tasks. The results showed that the ToM tasks were no more
related to each other than to some tasks of Gf and Gc, and that ToM tasks did not form a
consistent cluster. Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that ToM tasks are likely not measuring
a monolithic ToM construct. Study 2 examines individual differences in metalinguistic
awareness, executive function, and bilingualism as predictors of ToM. The results showed that
all variables significantly predicted ToM, but bilingualism was not a significant moderator of
ToM. Overall, the findings suggest that in this sample there was no difference in the processes
used to predict ToM based on being bilingual or monolingual. Implications for measurement and
individual differences in ToM are discussed.

Just for a moment, stand in their shoes.
– President Joseph R. Biden, January 20, 2021
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I.

Introduction to Theory of Mind
1. The Conceptualization of Theory of Mind
How do humans understand how other people feel and what they believe? Psychologists

and philosophers have long asked this basic question (see Wellman, 2017). Theory of mind
(ToM) is the ability to understand the beliefs, knowledge, and intentions of others based on their
behavior. The term was first coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) to refer to chimpanzees’
ability to infer human goals, and it was quickly adopted by psychologists to study humans’
ability to infer and predict the behavior of others. This was followed by a vast number of studies
on the topic. A simple search of the term “theory of mind” on PsycInfo reveals over 7000 articles
and 1000 books on Theory of Mind. This is not surprising given that ToM is necessary for
numerous complex cognitive tasks, including communication (e.g., Grice, 1989; Sperber &
Wilson, 1995), criticism (Cutting & Dunn, 2002), deception (Sodian, 1991), joking and lying
(Hughes & Leekam, 2004; Leekam & Prior, 1994), irony (Happé, 1994), pragmatic language
competence (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991), aggressive behavior (Happé & Frith, 1996), and
problem solving (Greenberg, Bellana, & Bialystok, 2013). In addition, ToM has been observed
across cultures and countries (Avis & Harris, 2016; Lee, Olson, & Torrance, 1999; Naito,
Komatsu, & Fuke, 1994; Tardif & Wellman, 2000) and impaired ToM has been linked to
psychiatric and developmental disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder in
both adults and children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985, 1986; Frith, 2004; Hughes &
Russell, 1993).
However, despite the numerous findings related to ToM (see Schaafsma et al., 2015), it is
still unclear what the processes underlying ToM are. This might be partly due to the various
operational definitions of the term ToM. For example, behavioral and neuroimaging research
1

usually distinguishes between language-independent implicit ToM (i.e., fast, automatic ToM)
and culture and language-dependent explicit ToM (i.e., slower, deliberative ToM) (Apperly &
Butterfill, 2009; Heyes & Frith, 2014; van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013). Other
researchers instead distinguish between ToM as an emergent property based on experience and
context and a latent ability that is expressed as the result of its interaction with general cognitive
processes, such as working memory and executive function (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 1994,
2012; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie, 1994). There are also differences between cognitive
compared to affective ToM (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Poletti et al., 2012) and
empathic ToM compared to representing the mental states of others (Preston & de Waal, 2002;
Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012; van Veluw & Chance, 2014). Moreover, some researchers consider
ToM in the realm of cognitive development while others refer to adult social cognition; more
generally, some conceptions of ToM consider it the ability to understand the self as opposed to
others, while other conceptions refer to ToM as empathic and emotional reactions. This wide
variety of conceptual definitions suggests that the overarching concept of ToM as it is used by
researchers in several fields likely entails a number of different processes and dimensions that
represent different dimensions of a ToM ability (Schaafsma et al., 2005; Quesque & Rossetti,
2020). Thus, ToM research faces several challenges that need to be addressed to advance the
field.
One consequence of the conceptual confusion around ToM research is that it hinders the
creation of valid tests. That is, because the description of the processes underling ToM is
confusing, it is difficult to find tests that adequately measure the processes that form ToM. The
variety of terminology and the creation of a wide number of ToM measures with poor
psychometric properties have contributed to the problem. Recent research shows that many of
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the measures commonly used to assess ToM likely assess different processes (Warnell &
Redcay, 2019), and it is unclear whether all of these processes really tap into an overarching
ToM ability or whether they are tapping different lower-level processes (Quesque & Rossetti,
2020). In fact, there has been strong criticism of the way ToM is investigated and conceptually
defined for a number of years (Bloom & German, 2000; Frith & Happé, 1994), yet the problem
continues. Thus, one of the main goals of the field should be to address the lack of psychometric
validity of ToM measures.
Another consequence of the conceptual confusion around ToM research is the lack of
understanding of the processes involved in ToM. In particular, due to inconsistent terminology,
instead of examining a general ToM ability, many studies have examined diverse subconstructs
that might not completely represent the ToM ability. Schaafsma et al. (2015) suggested that one
solution to the terminology issue is to not treat ToM as a “monolithic” ability (i.e., as an
indivisible construct). Instead, researchers should consider the flexible nature of the construct
when proposing theories that account for the processes that likely engage ToM. For example,
Wellman (2018) proposed that one way to understand these processes is to examine populations
that exhibit different ToM behaviors because of different individual experiences. Individual
differences can help inform variation in achieving ToM milestones. For example, ToM seems to
develop differently based on experience, such as different language ability (Milligan, Astington,
& Dack, 2007), having knowledge of mental state words (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002),
having siblings, and growing up bilingual (Wellman, 2018). Regarding bilingualism, researchers
have found that bilinguals on average complete ToM tasks at an earlier age than monolinguals
(see Schroeder, 2019, for a meta-analysis). Thus, one goal of the field should be to address how
various individual experiences including being bilingual impact ToM processes.
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The current studies focus on two aspects of ToM. The first study examines the
psychometric properties of current ToM measurements. The goal is to understand (a) the extent
to which researchers are measuring adequately the ToM construct and (b) the measures that
should be used, revised or abandoned by examining the tasks that load on a ToM construct, as
opposed to other related but different constructs (i.e., verbal ability). This study is expected to
shed light on whether ToM constitutes a coherent psychometric construct. The second study
focuses on ToM research on bilinguals as a means of understanding whether ToM performance
variation is the result of bilinguals engaging different processes than monolinguals. Specifically,
the goal is to assess whether ToM performance can be predicted by different cognitive
mechanisms for bilinguals than for monolinguals. Ultimately, the goal of the current research is
to expand ToM theoretical frameworks by examining the extent to which the processes engaged
in ToM vary based on individual differences.

1. Psychometric and Measurement Issues in ToM Research
Numerous psychometric tasks and tests have been created to measure ToM. The first task
created to assess ToM was the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This task could not
have existed if it were not for the help of the philosophers who created the perspective-taking
paradigm (Bennett, 2019; Dennett, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1978), inspiring Wimmer and Perner (1983).
The wealth of ToM research that has followed Wimmer and Perner’s study has led to the
creation of a number of tasks and tests that assess different aspects of ToM. Some of the
processes that these tasks measure include false belief understanding (Berstein, Thornton, &
Sommerville, 2010; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), accounting for others’ perspectives (Dumontheil,
Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), the ability to infer mental states from the expression of people’s
eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
4

Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001), detection of faux pas (e.g., Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone,
Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), deceptive intentions (e.g., Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009), understanding
others’ thoughts (Keysar, 1994), and the difference between Level 1 perspective-taking (i.e.,
understanding that others’ line of sight differs) and Level 2 perspective-taking (i.e., mentally
adopting someone else’s point of view) (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite,
Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010), among countless others.
Despite the fast proliferation of ToM tasks, appropriate psychometric assessments of the
validity of existing ToM measures have only recently been studied, with results suggesting
concerns about the underlying structure being measured. Specifically, Warnell and Redcay
(2019) examined coherence among ToM tasks using a psychometric approach. The researchers
examined the relationship among different ToM measures (including the false belief task, the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, and pragmatic language comprehension, among others) in
child and adult populations. They found that an exploratory factor analysis did not support a
clear structure underlying a ToM factor for the adult group. In addition, even though factor
analysis was not possible due to low sample size for the child sample, correlations among the
tasks administered to children also revealed poor correlations. These findings suggest that the
measures used to assess ToM do not adequately tap into a reliable construct. The results of this
study are consistent with recent theoretical accounts proposing that ToM is not likely a single
construct, but that instead is a composite of both social and cognitive abilities (e.g., Apperly,
2012; Gerrans & Stone, 2008; Schaafsma et al., 2015). However, an earlier meta-analysis by
Baker, Peterson, Pulos, and Kirkland (2014) found that the correlations among ToM tasks were
generally higher than those found by Warnell and Redcay (2019). Therefore, further research is
needed to understand whether measures typically used to assess ToM are indeed adequately

5

measuring the same underlying construct. Thus, it is critical to clarify what measures of ToM
should be used, revised, or abandoned.
A first attempt to clarify ToM tasks was performed by Quesque and Rossetti (2020). The
researchers conducted a systematic review of a large ToM task battery to assess the face validity
of over 20 measures of ToM used by researchers from a variety of areas, including
developmental, clinical, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. They concluded that
there were large differences in the underlying cognitive mechanisms that each of the tasks
seemed to measure, including perspective-taking, eye tracking, and inference making.
Importantly, they suggested that a paradigm shift in the methodologies traditionally used to
explore social cognition are necessary to ensure terminological clarity and to advance the field.
For this reason, they called for the need to identify and classify the measures that correctly assess
ToM compared to others that likely only measure lower-order cognitive processes, such as
kinematic processing (like automatic eye gaze movement; Obhi, 2012), social attention (Heyes,
2014) or emotion recognition (Oakley et al., 2016). Specifically, the researchers concluded that
many of the tasks were likely measuring lower-order social-cognitive processes like those above,
rather than a higher-order ToM ability, such as inhibiting one’s perspective, creating models of
alternative emotional responses, and updating one’s own knowledge.
Further, Quesque and Rossetti (2020) emphasized the need for enforcing strict criteria for
the use of ToM tasks. Specifically, they propose that any task that is used to assess ToM should
meet two essential criteria: mentalizing and nonemerging. Mentalizing refers to whether success
in a given task necessitates understanding others’ mental states or whether it could be attributed
to lower-order cognitive processes instead. For example, understanding emotion from people’s
eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) might not actually tap into
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higher-order processes required to understand how other people feel, but instead might be the
result of lower-order perceptual responses. Nonemerging refers to whether a given task requires
representing the mental state of another person when that mental state differs from the
participant’s mental state. Following the previous example, understanding the emotion expressed
by somebody’s eyes does not require that the participant inhibits their own emotion. That is, if
the emotion in somebody’s eyes represents anger, participants do not need to inhibit what they
are feeling to realize it is anger. Higher-order ToM requires both understanding of others’ mental
states and the ability to inhibit one’s own. Quesque and Rossetti (2020) argued that numerous
tasks created and implemented to date do not meet both of these criteria and are therefore not
measuring ToM.
Despite the apparent lack of construct validity across tasks, many studies have used ToM
tasks to examine the relationship between ToM and other cognitive abilities. Specifically,
research has shown that ToM is related to verbal ability and executive function (EF) (e.g.,
German & Hehman, 2006; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), leading many researchers to
suggest that ToM performance requires the development of the processes underlying these
abilities. However, given the poor correlations among tasks of ToM, it is unclear why the
relationship between ToM and other cognitive abilities emerges. In fact, it is possible that the
relationship among cognitive abilities, such as verbal ability and EF, is the result of ToM tasks
that share processes with tasks of EF and verbal ability, rather than reflecting a relationship
among constructs. Unsurprisingly, many of the ToM tasks used in the literature have components
that, at face value, share processes with constructs commonly studied in the cognitive abilities
research literature, such as crystalized and fluid intelligence. Therefore, to understand the
construct validity of ToM measures, the relationship among ToM tasks and other cognitive
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constructs should be examined. This would help elucidate the tasks that measure a specific ToM
ability, and the tasks that measure other related, but different, cognitive abilities.
More specifically, the ToM research literature has largely overlooked the possible
relationship between tasks of ToM and tasks of specific sub-abilities that constitute general
intelligence. For over one hundred years, intelligence researchers have studied the ways in which
people develop, use, and differ in cognitive abilities (for a review, see Kovacs & Conway, 2016).
This long tradition emanates from research using cognitive test scores to extract a single common
factor, g, representing general intelligence (Spearman, 1904, 1927). g is thought to be the result of
the positive manifold, that is, the largely replicated finding that cognitive abilities are consistently
positively correlated. For this reason, many researchers have traditionally interpreted g as the
common cause underlying individual differences in task performance and the covariance among
different measures (Gottfredson, 1997). Early intelligence research has shown that general
intelligence is related to various specific abilities.
One of the earliest models of intelligence was the fluid/crystallized (Gf/Gc) model of
intelligence (Cattell, 1963, 1971; Horn, 1994). The Gf/Gc model proposed that general intelligence
was the result of two specific and opposite abilities: Gf or fluid intelligence and Gc or crystallized
intelligence. Gf was defined as the ability to solve problems in novel situations, regardless of
previous knowledge and Gc was defined as the ability to solve problems using previously acquired
skills, largely related to the amount of formal schooling one has been exposed to (Kan, Kievit,
Dolan, & van der Maas, 2011). These two abilities have been expanded and incorporated into more
recent models of intelligence, including the Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model (McGrew, 2009),
which combines the Gf/Gc model with other specific abilities, such as visual-spatial (Gv),
processing speed (Gr) and memory retrieval (Gr). Importantly, Gf and Gc remain two of the
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strongest factors in models of intelligence and have been replicated consistently across the
literature and across neuroscientific and developmental studies.
While ToM has been related broadly to IQ, usually measured as school achievement (Baker
et al., 2014; Coyle, Elpers, Gonzalez, Freeman, and Baggio, 2018; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013;
Navarro, Goring, & Conway, 2021), it has not been psychometrically compared to specific
measures of Gf and Gc. Gf and Gc represent two correlated but different dimensions of
intelligence and several reliable tasks are used to measure each construct. It is important to
understand whether the correlation between ToM and cognitive abilities is due to share variance
among tasks that measure independent but related constructs, or whether, instead, existing tasks of
ToM do not in fact measure a ToM construct but rather other cognitive abilities.

2. Current Theoretical Frameworks of ToM
Despite the methodological issues of ToM research, numerous theoretical approaches
have been proposed to explain the processes underlying this ability. Specifically, ToM was first
studied from a philosophical perspective, or “philosophy of mind” (Pylyshyn, 1978) that
attempted to explain how people were able to “read” other people’s minds (Davies & Stone,
1995). Unfortunately, philosophy of mind accounts were rarely empirically tested, forcing
experimental psychologists to disengage from early theories (Apperly, 2010, p.5).
Empirically supported theories of ToM can be classified according to two features,
namely (a) whether they describe ToM in terms of domain-general vs. domain-specific
processes, and (b) whether they view ToM as a subset of cognitive “modules” (i.e., theoretical
specialized compartments). Theories within (a) fall in the so-called Competence-Performance
framework (Scholl & Leslie, 2001; Wellman et al., 2001); theories within (b) focus on describing
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the presence of one or more related or unrelated modules (in which ToM’s sub-abilities are
divided) that form the ToM ability.

i.

Competence framework

Gopnik and Wellman (1994)’s theory-theory is the main theory within the Competence
framework. The theory-theory takes its name from the idea that children behave like “little
scientists” (Gopnik, 1996a, p. 486) who create theories of people’s intentions and revise those
theories as new evidence emerges. The theory-theory proposed that ToM is an ability that
emerges in childhood as a result of experience. Accordingly, children have a basic ToM (i.e.,
“folk psychology”) to infer the mental states of others and they use it to naturally construct
theories that explain the world around them. When children fail to reach a goal because they
have not considered others’ mental states, they adjust their theory accordingly. Therefore,
children learn that individuals hold different mental states and that mental states can vary as a
result of experience (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2000). This trial and error approach allows
children to “realize” (i.e., through a conceptual change) that people have different mental states
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). That is, children first have a “mentalistic” psychological theory based
on non-representational states (e.g., desires and perceptions) and gradually develop a mental
representational theory of other people’s mental states (Flavell & Miller, 1998; Gopnik &
Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1991).
However, the theory-theory assumed that this change occurs in childhood and therefore
cannot explain findings showing that older children and adolescents sometimes make ToM errors
if the difficulty of the task is age-appropriate (Miller, 2010), indicating that the older the
individual the more complex the mental state can be. These led researchers to explore whether
ToM was influenced by cognitive abilities that develop during childhood. Specifically, numerous
10

studies have found a relationship between EF and ToM, leading researchers to conclude that
older children might require the use of more challenging tasks because EF increases with age.
Many researchers propose that the strong relationship between EF and ToM (e.g., German &
Hehman, 2006) and the fact that changes in ToM and EF seem to occur at about the same
developmental stage (Carlson, 2005; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008) indicate that ToM and EF
are likely related (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; German &
Hehman, 2006; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; Hala, Hug & Henderson, 2003).

ii.

Performance framework

To address the EF-ToM relationship, several theories have emerged within what is
known as the Performance Framework. Specifically, Expression, Emergence, and Cognitive
Complexity and Control-Revised (CCCR) performance theories attempt to describe how ToM
develops by explaining how this development is affected by EF. All these theories have in
common that they consider EF to be an essential aspect of ToM but differ in the specific role that
EF plays in ToM use and development.

a. Expression
Expression theories suggest that an existing latent ToM is “activated” by EF and
therefore can only be used when complex EF begins to develop. Leslie and collaborators (Leslie,
1994; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) proposed the ToM mechanism
(ToM-M), in which ToM was formed by a dual-component model, with a largely innate domainspecific ToM mechanism responsible for representing beliefs and desires, and a domain-general
“selection processor” that develops gradually throughout the lifespan and allows interference
resolution of conflicting perspectives via EF. Clearly influenced by nativist language production
11

theories (e.g., Chomsky’s Language Acquisition Device, 1960), Leslie’s theory suggests that a
ToM system is in place from birth, but this system cannot be “expressed” until EF skills are
available to control it (see also Carlson, & Moses, 1998). Thus, according to this theory, EF
allows the “expression” of a latent ToM ability.

b. Emergence
Emergence theories suggest that EF allows the creation of an otherwise non-existing
ToM, unlike Expression theory that proposes that ToM is an innate ability. Moses (2001)
proposed that using EF (e.g., top-down self-control) makes understanding other people’s mental
states possible, even if they conflict with one’s own mental states. Thus, EF processes can be
abstracted to other contexts, evolving into an independent ToM mechanism that would otherwise
not exist (Moses, 2001; Russell, 1996). A different twist of the Emergence theory proposes that,
instead, developing ToM is what allows the development of EF (Perner, Lang, and Kloo, 2002).
However, since temporal precedence cannot be established, this view of Emergence theory has
not gained popularity.

c. CCCR
Finally, Zelazo, Muller, Frye, and Marcovitch (2003) proposed the Cognitive Complexity
and Control-Revised (CCCR) theory. This theory suggests that both abilities, ToM and EF, are
sub-abilities caused by an overarching general ability to reason about and attend to hierarchical
rules. Specifically, Zelazo et al. (2003) propose that age-related changes in EF are the result of
changes in the complexity of the rules that children can simultaneously use to solve a given task.
According to this view, children solve coordinated conditional rules (“if I go to the store today,
then I will buy milk, otherwise I’ll drink juice”) by reflecting on the rules these statements
12

represent, thus comparing them to other rules and embedding them under higher order rules. In
this example, the conditional statement about the store is dependent on the completion of another
event (today). As children age, this general rule-solving ability increases. Thus, CCCR theory
proposes that both EF and ToM are byproducts of children’s ability to follow and decide to
follow hierarchical rules.
Most of the ToM theories can fit within the Competence-Performance frameworks.
Nevertheless, more recent theories have focus on describing ToM from a different perspective.
These theories can be considered parallel to the Competence-Performance frameworks; the main
difference is that their focus is on describing the structure of ToM from a neurobiological
perspective, while the Competence-Performance frameworks attempt to explain ToM from a
developmental perspective. For this reason, more recent accounts are rooted in neuroimaging
research and describe possible neural areas that contribute to ToM. At least four accounts about
ToM have been proposed based on this evidence.
First, Gerrans and Stone (2008) proposed that ToM could be the result of subcomponents that focus on different aspects of perspective-taking; more specifically, they
proposed an overarching domain-specific ToM module (influenced by multiple low-level
domain-specific social processes) and an overarching domain-general module (that interacts with
domain-specific processes). This account attempts to explain ToM by describing the interrelated
nature of ToM, EF, and contextual cues for resolution of domain-general and specific
components of ToM. Second, Apperly (2012) proposed an account to unify ToM and the
cognitive tasks used to measure it. This theory attempted to provide a better account of the
psychometric structures emerging from ToM measurement. According to this account, ToM does
not just constitute a specific construct as it was originally proposed, but instead spans multiple
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cognitive abilities in an interactive way. Similarly, the account by Schaafsma et al. (2015)
proposed that various independent domain-specific low-level processes (e.g., eye gaze, intention
tracking) form a ToM construct, instead of having a single-module general ToM. In other words,
Schaafsma et al.’s theory claims that ToM is formed by domain-general processes that explain
relationships among tasks, but also have domain-specific components that are not accounted for
by general processes. Some evidence from the last two accounts comes from neuroimaging
studies showing that ToM is likely not just a single construct (Frith & Frith, 2003; Schurz,
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014). Instead, despite general agreement over some of the
areas engaged when responding to ToM tasks (i.e., ToM network), recent meta-analytic work has
found that distinct activation profiles are found when examining separate tasks (as opposed to
aggregated tasks) in a brain activation map (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), suggesting that
some areas are engaged more often when responding to some ToM tasks, but not others. In
addition, brain activation patterns seem to also vary throughout the lifespan, with responses to
ToM tasks starting off more diffused in early childhood and becoming more concentrated in
adulthood (Bowman, Liu, Meltzoff, & Wellman, 2012; Bowman & Wellman, 2014). This
evidence indicates that ToM is likely composed of different processes and can change
throughout development.
Finally, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed a theory to account for developmental
differences throughout the lifespan. Specifically, Apperly and Butterfill’s theory suggested that
there is a two-system ToM ability that can account for both the EF-ToM relationship and
conceptual changes based on experience or context. This dual-system view is based on classical
dual-process theory that proposes that human cognition is defined by a distinction between
effortless, intuitive, automatic processes (System 1) and effortful, deliberative, operational
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processes (System 2) (De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook,
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a). According to Apperly and Butterfill, in ToM System 1 is used by
infants and young children, but also by adults when the situation does not require effortful
processing, such as when there is no perspective conflict. System 1 thus precedes and contributes
to System 2, a fully formed ability to comprehend other mental states that requires effortful
processing.
Discerning among all of these theories is difficult because by definition, they are not
independent, and there is evidence that supports several of the claims in each model. The reason
why they are supported is likely because each theory focuses on different aspects of ToM. Some
theories focus on the type of processes used (general vs. specific), some focus on the properties
of psychometric tasks, some on brain regions engaged in ToM, and yet others focus on the
developmental aspect of ToM. Therefore, it is possible to find evidence for each of these
separate aspects, in turn supporting different theories. A unifying theory could bring all of this
evidence together to explain ToM better from different angles. However, obtaining a unifying
theory that encompasses all these areas is difficult. Much evidence comes from developmental
research that has focused on examining ToM in child populations. Therefore, to better
understand the origin of these theories, evidence from developmental studies should be
considered first.

3. Developmental Evidence for the Competence and Performance
Frameworks
Children’s ability to understand mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, desires) is a
foundational social-cognitive skill related to a variety of healthy developmental milestones, such
as social competence, peer acceptance, and academic success (Carlson, Koenig, & Harms, 2013).
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A vast amount of research has reported that by age 5 there are significant changes in children’s
understanding of mental states (Harris, 2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004). For example, by the end of
their first year, children can treat individuals as agents with intentions (e.g., desires, goals)
(Wellman, 2018). Specifically, Brandone and Wellman (2009) found that 6 and 8-month-olds
have longer looking times to areas where they expect a person to look for an object than to areas
where they do not expect a person to look and Behne, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005)
found that 9-18 month-old infants were more impatient (e.g., reaching, looking away) when an
adult could not hand them a toy than when an adult did not want to hand them the toy; this was
not true for 6-month-olds. This behavior indicates that infants understand basic intentions by the
time they are 9 months, but not earlier.
However, although children can execute many abilities that require basic perspectivetaking by the age of 2 (i.e., emotion, intention, or perception), they largely do not understand
mental concepts like knowledge and belief. Specifically, 1- and 2-year-old children often do not
distinguish between their knowledge and beliefs and the knowledge and beliefs of others
(Carlson, Koenig, & Harms, 2013). This was first demonstrated by Wimmer and Perner (1983).
In their study, the researchers administered the Sally and Anne false-belief task1 to children with
ages ranging from 3 to 9 years of age. While most of the 5-9-year-olds provided accurate
responses, the 3-4-year-olds did not, indicating that the ability to represent mental states of other

1
The false-belief task is used to assess ToM in 2-5 year-olds (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). False belief
understanding indicates that children comprehend (a) that agents have different intentions and knowledge, and (b)
that thoughts can differ from objects in the real world (Wellman, 2018). The task presents two characters (e.g., Sally
and Anne) in a child-friendly way. Children first see Sally hide an object in location A, then go away. While Sally is
absent, Anne moves the object from location A to B. After children see the scene, they are asked whether Sally will
first look for the object in location A or in location B. To respond correctly that Sally will look in location A, a child
must infer that Sally does not know that the object has been moved, and therefore that she does not have the same
knowledge and beliefs as the child. Children under 3 years of age generally fail to pass this task by answering that
Sally will look for the object in location B, suggesting that they do not understand that mental states differ.
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people becomes established at the ages of 4-6. Wellman Cross and Watson (2001)’s metaanalysis of 178 false-belief studies reported consistent findings: most 3-4-year-olds do not
respond accurately to false-belief tasks compared to older children, indicating that they largely
do not understand the mental states of others. Overall, research to date suggests that
understanding mental states undergoes a change at age 3-4.
This change is largely distinguished by the difference between Level-1 and Level-2
perspective taking. That is, infants can understand that people see things differently (Level-1
perspective taking), even if they do not yet understand that others can think different things and
have different perspectives (Level-2 perspective taking) (Flavell, 1974, 1977; Flavell, Everett,
Croft, & Flavell, 1981). For example, Masangkay et al. (1974) administered a series of tasks to
2-to-5-year-olds (e.g., picture task, turtle task) in which objects presented a different perspective
for the experimenter and for the children. They found that 2-year-olds correctly indicated when
the experimenter could not see an object even when the child could (Level-1), but only older
children indicated when the experimenter could see an object from a different perspective (i.e.,
from the top as opposed to from the left) than the child (Level-1). This suggests that Level-1
develops before Level-2. Similarly, Moll and Tomasello (2006) found that on average 24-montholds, but not 18-month-olds, helped an adult find an object that was visible to them but not to the
adult (Level-1), indicating that children younger than 24 months did not exhibit Level-1
perspective taking.
The developmental differences between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective have been
largely taken to support theories within the Competence framework (e.g., theory-theory; Gopnik
& Wellman, 1994). That is, children originally have a “theory” of what other people know, but
since they are not always correct, they experience communication errors. This forces children to
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adjust and reconstruct their initial theory to correctly understand what other people know, intend,
and believe. Evidence from studies comparing Level-1 and Level-2 perspective taking is thought
to indicate that ToM can evolve and become more sophisticated as a result of interaction with the
world. However, other findings cannot be explained solely within the Competence framework.
Specifically, some research has shown that resolution of false-belief tasks is related to executive
functioning (EF) performance. This was first reported by Leslie and Polizzi (1998), who
examined responses to false belief problems that required more EF, that is, negative false beliefs
(i.e., a false belief task where the protagonist’s desire is to avoid rather than approach a target).
4-year-olds in the study performed worse in the negative compared to the standard false-belief
task, suggesting that more EF was needed for the negative tasks. This was extended by Carlson
and Moses (2001), who conducted a correlational study to examine the relationship between EF
(i.e., inhibitory control) and ToM in a sample of preschool-age children. The researchers found
that inhibitory control was strongly correlated with ToM performance, even after controlling for
factors like language, age, verbal ability, and family size. Numerous developmental and
neuroscientific replications of these findings (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; van der Meer,
Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011) have led to the conclusion that, unlike the
Competence framework suggests, EF is a necessary factor for ToM development, and it likely
allows the use of a complex ToM ability. Thus, research examining the relationship between EF
and ToM provides support for theories within the Performance framework of ToM (e.g., ToMM
theory; Leslie, 1994), that is, children can only utilize their latent ToM correctly when they
develop EF naturally with age (i.e., when they are able to inhibit egocentric responses), but not
before.
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The conflict between these theoretical frameworks is known as the competenceperformance debate (Wellman et al., 2001; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Since both frameworks make
similar predictions about ToM (i.e., that ToM begins developing in preschool years), it has not
been possible to discriminate among them. To decide among these theories, researchers have
studied how individual differences affect the development of ToM (Wellman, 2018).
Specifically, growing up bilingual seems to help children reach the milestone of passing falsebelief tasks earlier in development. Examining the reasons underlying bilinguals’ performance
can inform research on the extent to which these opposing frameworks explain ToM.

4. Explaining ToM mechanisms: bilingualism and ToM
The Competence-Performance debate (Wellman et al., 2001; Scholl & Leslie, 2001)
cannot be easily resolved by studying standard samples of healthy children because both
frameworks make the same predictions for this cohort. That is, theories from both frameworks
propose that ToM develops between 3 and 5 years of age due to a different underlying process
(i.e., experience and EF, respectively). However, Wellman (2018) suggested that studying
individual differences in reaching the ToM milestone (i.e., passing false-belief tasks) could help
researchers understand the processes underlying ToM performance. Individual differences, such
as engaging in social-pretend play, having siblings, or growing up bilingual (Wellman, 2018)
have been found to affect the development of ToM. Specifically, bilingual children (i.e., children
who grow up learning and speaking more than one language) have been shown to outperform
monolingual children in ToM false-belief tasks (Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Carlson & Moses,
2001; Goetz, 2003; Kovacs, 2009;) and this effect seems to be stable across tasks and not subject
to publication bias (see Schroeder, 2019 for a meta-analysis).

19

Understanding the processes underlying bilinguals’ ToM performance could help explain
the processes that are engaged in ToM ability. Specifically, bilinguals present differences in
factors that influence various cognitive mechanisms. For example, metalinguistic awareness and
vocabulary size are predictors of ToM performance (Altman, Goldstein, & Armon-Lotem, 2018;
Diaz & Farrar, 2017). Bilinguals also show different neurological development. Specifically,
older adults who are bilinguals present stronger cognitive and linguistic efficiency (Baum &
Titone, 2014). Differences in bilinguals’ responses to cognitive ability tasks might reflect
variation in the type of cognitive processes used by bilinguals as opposed to monolinguals. This
indicates that individual differences in ToM also might be related to variation in the cognitive
processes that bilinguals use when responding to ToM tasks.
Two explanations have been proposed for bilinguals’ ToM performance. First, Bialystok
and Senman (2004) proposed that bilinguals have enhanced EF as a result of constant conscious
switching between languages (Bialystok, 1999). Specifically, Bialystok suggested that bilingual
children have domain-general EF advantages over monolinguals on tasks that involve ambiguous
and conflicting information thanks to their experience controlling both of their languages
(Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Codd, 2000; Bialystok & Majumder, 1998; Bialystok &
Viswanathan, 2009). Bialystok suggested that, because ToM also requires resolution of
ambiguous and conflicting information, EF advantages might allow bilingual children to
outperform their monolingual peers in tasks that require ToM. Thus, advantages in EF would
increase ToM performance, supporting the Performance framework. Second, Goetz (2003)
proposed, instead, that bilinguals’ conscious switching between languages could be the result of
bilinguals’ awareness of the languages that people around them can and cannot speak (Kloo &
Perner, 2003). This, in turns, could translate into improved metalinguistic awareness, that is,
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awareness that objects and events can be represented in more than one way (Bialystok 1988,
1992, 1999), helping bilinguals comprehend that individuals have different mental states at an
earlier age. Studies have found that young bilingual children are able to switch to the appropriate
language of their interlocutor (Genesee, Boivin, & Nicoladis, 1996; Genesee, Nicoladis, &
Paradis, 1995; Lanza, 1992), suggesting that bilinguals may be more aware of the fact that other
people have different mental states, than are monolingual children (Goetz, 2003). Thus,
advantages in metalinguistic awareness would increase ToM performance, supporting the
Competence framework.
Both of these hypotheses (EF advantage and metalinguistic awareness) can potentially
explain why bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM tasks and evidence for both of these
views has been found. For example, Goetz (2003) examined ToM performance of bilingual and
monolingual 3-4-year-olds in two temporally separate sessions. Goetz found that bilinguals
performed better than monolinguals in most of the tasks in the first session, but the difference
disappeared in the second session. Goetz proposed that this happened because bilinguals have
more ToM “practice” as a result of their interactions with people who speak different languages,
but this difference can be overcome if monolinguals practice their ToM, therefore suggesting that
bilinguals have more ToM experience, but not enhanced EF ability.
On the other hand, Kovacs (2009) found results that supported the opposite view.
Specifically, she administered 3-year-old monolingual and bilingual children two false-belief
tasks. One false-belief task was a modified language-based task (i.e., requiring metalinguistic
abilities) and the other was a standard false-belief task (i.e., not requiring additional
metalinguistic abilities). Kovacs hypothesized that bilinguals should perform better in the
modified language-based task than in the standard task because the modified task depicted a
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language-switch context that should have facilitated ToM if bilinguals indeed have improved
ToM skills due to metalinguistic awareness. However, Kovacs found that bilingual children
outperformed monolinguals on both tasks, not just in the modified task, suggesting that
bilinguals’ performance is not due to a metalinguistic advantage, but instead could be due to a
general EF advantage over monolinguals.
These contradictory results are reflective of the theoretical debate around the processes
underlying the ToM ability. However, the idea that bilinguals might have an “advantage” in
either EF or metalinguistic awareness has been rejected by some researchers. Instead, more
recent studies indicate that bilingual children could be using different processes to engage ToM
altogether, resulting in different development throughout the lifespan. In contrast to the
Competence-Performance debate, these studies suggest that treating metalinguistic awareness
and EF as dichotomous processes might not adequately account for bilinguals’ performance.
Specifically, Diaz and Farrar (2017) conducted a correlational study to examine whether
bilinguals showed differences in the types of processes used to solve false-belief ToM tasks
across a year. Matched children performed a false-belief task, a metalinguistic task, and an EF
task. The researchers found that EF at time 1 largely predicted ToM performance at time 2 for
monolinguals (but not bilinguals), while metalinguistic awareness at time 1 largely predicted
ToM performance for bilinguals (but not monolinguals) at time 2. Similarly, Buac and
Kaushanskaya (2019) found that EF predicted ToM performance for monolingual, but not
bilingual, children while linguistic ability (measured using the Clinical Evaluation of Language
Fundamentals, CELF; Wiig, Semel, & Secord, 2013 – often used to measure metalinguistic
awareness in children) predicted ToM performance for bilingual but not monolingual children.
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These findings suggest that instead of bilinguals having a quantitative advantage (i.e.,
bilinguals use the same cognitive processes as monolinguals, but they do so more effectively),
bilinguals could have a qualitative advantage, that is, bilinguals and monolinguals might be
using, to an extent, different mechanisms when completing ToM tasks with one set of
mechanisms producing superior results. That is, bilinguals could rely on metalinguistic
awareness to engage ToM more than other processes. By doing so, bilinguals might alleviate
some of the cognitive load from (a) inferring the mental states of others and (b) inhibiting one’s
own mental states, which taxes EF resources, resulting in more accurate performance.
If the processes underlying ToM can vary based on specific individual experiences, such
as being bilingual, then adults’ performance should reflect these variations. Although early
studies dismissed ToM research with adults because adults have a “fully developed” ToM
(Apperly, 2010, p.86), there is evidence that adults show individual differences in ToM
performance (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Keysar, Lin,
& Barr, 2003; Navarro, Macnamara, Glucksberg, & Conway, 2020). In addition, ToM develops
gradually throughout the lifespan and becomes increasingly more accurate in adulthood
(Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), suggesting that the processes used to engage ToM
development in childhood could continue to be engaged in adulthood. In fact, compared to
adults, older children and adolescents present neurological changes in brain areas engaged when
responding to ToM tasks (e.g., right temporo-parietal junction), suggesting that ToM is not an
immutable ability (e.g., Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009). Because there is
some evidence that adult bilinguals might also outperform adult monolinguals on ToM tasks
(Javor, 2016, Rubio-Fernandez & Glucksberg, 2012, Navarro & Conway, 2021), it is possible
that, just as it has been observed in children, adult bilinguals engage different processes than
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monolinguals to perform ToM tasks. If this is the case, then studying bilingual and monolingual
adults could shed some light on which specific processes are involved in ToM, and which
processes bilinguals preferentially engage.

5. Individual Differences in ToM in Adulthood
In recent years, there has been an increase in the amount of research examining ToM in
adults. This is likely because ToM is relevant for a number of everyday tasks performed by
adults, such as complex social navigation, perspective taking, and complex communication
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 2002). ToM understanding is first observed when children achieve the
ToM milestone (Wellman, 2018) at 3-4 years of age, however this ability continues to develop
along different dimensions throughout childhood (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) and
adulthood (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). In fact, ToM seems to engage multiple
brain areas throughout development, including the medial prefrontal cortex, and the left and right
temporoparietal junction (i.e., the ToM network). In addition, different specific regions within
these areas are utilized at different developmental stages, reflecting the way in which ToM
processes change (Bowman & Wellman, 2014). For example, in infancy, regions engaged in
ToM tend to be more diffuse (i.e., more areas are activated); however, there is a gradual
incorporation of regions in the ToM network and a shift in the type of functions used as
development proceeds (Bowman & Wellman, 2014). This suggests that changes that occur in
infancy could influence later development, and therefore ToM development does not necessarily
end in early childhood.
One example of developmental changes in ToM is reflected in research by Dumontheil,
Apperly, and Blakemore (2010). The researchers examined participants aged 7 to 27 (divided in
five age groups: 7-9, 10-11, 12-14, 15-17, and 19-27) on a ToM task that required taking into
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account what a virtual avatar knew and did not know, compared to a control task where there
was not an avatar. The researchers reported that ToM performance increased steadily with age,
such that younger adults performed better than children and young adults performed better than
all other groups. However, ToM errors were observed for all groups, suggesting that while ToM
performance improves with age, since all groups presented ToM errors, ToM is still likely to be
cognitively effortful and subject to individual differences. In addition, Dumontheil, Apperly, and
Blakemore also found that while adults’ ToM performance was better than all other groups, they
did not perform better than the young adult group (aged 14-17) in a task of EF. According to the
researchers, this might suggest that while ToM and EF are related, ToM continues to develop
even after EF plateaus (for example, as a result of exposure to daily experiences where ToM is
necessary). According to the researchers, the disassociation between ToM and EF suggests that
ToM also relies on cognitive processes other than EF and that the type of process engaged at a
given moment could vary based on an individual’s cognitive “blueprint”, such as being bilingual
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003).
While the specific processes that affect ToM performance in adults are unclear, research
suggests that adults engage cognitively effortful processes to resolve ToM tasks. For example, a
number of studies have reported that adults have egocentric biases about other people’s thoughts
and beliefs. Specifically, adults tend to think that other people will make decisions based on what
they know but not necessarily what other people know. Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs and Nye
(1996) found that when participants knew that a character’s belief was true, they judged it less
likely that the character would change its mind than when the character’s belief was false (i.e.,
reality bias). Similarly, Birch and Bloom (2007) found that when participants knew the correct
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location of a hidden object, they indicated that it was less likely that another person would look
for the object in the incorrect location (i.e., the curse of knowledge).
These egocentric tendencies on perspective-taking tasks have been found in numerous
studies among adult populations (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Navarro,
Macnamara, Glucksberg, & Conway, 2020; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron,
2003), suggesting that engaging ToM is cognitively demanding, and therefore likely taxes EF
resources. However, it is not clear whether adults can engage other processes, such as
metalinguistic awareness, when utilizing ToM.
While an increasing number of studies have examined how task performance varies based
on cognitive demands exerted by ToM, few studies have examined whether ToM performance in
adult populations varies based on individual differences, just like it has been observed with
children. The study by Diaz and Farrar (2017), described above, suggests that metalinguistic
awareness is used to engage ToM by bilingual children, while EF seems to be more engaged by
monolingual children. Early advances in metalinguistic awareness could influence normal ToM
development, such that the processes engaged to use ToM early on in development could
continue to be used throughout childhood and into adulthood, while other processes like verbal
ability and EF might only be engaged when the task becomes more effortful. Researchers have
considered that growing up bilingual merely helps children reach the ToM “milestone” earlier
than monolinguals, but have not examined whether bilingualism has an impact on the processes
engaged in ToM (Wellman, 2018). However, results of Diaz and Farrar (2017) and Buack and
Kaushanskaya (2019) suggest that bilingual experiences can lead to using alternative processes,
like metalinguistic awareness, to utilize ToM.
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There is limited evidence that adult bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM
performance. Rubio-Fernandez and Glucksberg (2012) found that college-age bilinguals had
fewer eye fixations in the egocentric item of the false belief task than monolinguals, thus
outperforming monolinguals. In addition, Rubio-Fernandez and Glucksberg found that the
bilinguals in their study also outperformed monolinguals in the Simon task of inhibitory control.
Finally, performance in the ToM task was correlated with performance in the Simon task for
both groups. This led the researchers to conclude that one possible factor underlying bilinguals’
ToM performance could be cognitive control. Javor (2016) also provided evidence of existing
differences between bilingual and monolingual adults’ ToM performance. Bilingual and
monolingual adults completed a Hungarian version of the ToM short stories test (Dodell-Feder,
Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013) that requires participants to read several stories and indicate
whether socially awkward or inappropriate situations occurred, as well as what the characters in
the story felt, knew, and believed. Javor reported that, overall, bilingual participants
outperformed monolinguals on accurate responses to the ToM test, suggesting that adult
bilinguals might also outperform monolinguals in this test of ToM. Finally, Navarro and Conway
(2021) found that bilingual adults outperformed monolinguals in responses to trials that required
taking the perspective of another person and inhibiting their own perspective (i.e., director task).
Overall, these findings suggest that bilingualism is associated with individuals’ ability to take
into account the perspective of another person, nevertheless it is unclear whether the processes
involved in this advantage are the same processes found among children populations.
Given that bilingual children might use metalinguistic awareness (Buac & Kaushanskaya,
2019; Diaz & Farrar, 2017) to determine that others’ perspectives differ from their own earlier
than monolinguals, perhaps bilingual adults also engage different processes than their
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monolingual peers to support ToM. This would indicate that ToM is more flexible than
previously considered and that the use of a specific process (e.g., metalinguistic awareness)
during childhood can carry over into adulthood. Examining this possibility would elucidate the
extent to which ToM can be accounted for by the Competence and Performance frameworks as
well as understanding the extent to which individual differences influence ToM.

6. Interim Summary
Theory of Mind (ToM) has been studied empirically for over 30 years, leading to a
number of robust findings, including the age at which children begin showing belief
understanding, the psychological disorders associated with impaired ToM, the relationship
between ToM, language ability, and executive function, and the behaviors associated with ToM
performance in adulthood. However, a number of methodological issues have recently arisen in
the way ToM is conceptualized and measured (e.g., Quesque & Rossetti, 2020), suggesting that
there could be deep issues in the construct validity of ToM tasks. In addition, there is still
controversy about the processes that affect, intervene, and are engaged when using ToM, and
little is known about how these processes can be affected or changed by individual differences,
such as growing up bilingual.
This dissertation will focus on two areas that can contribute to better understanding ToM
and ToM-related processes. First, the psychometric properties of the tasks will be examined. This
is important (a) to ensure that ToM measures are assessing the two key criteria of ToM ability,
that is, the mentalizing criterion and the nonemerging criterion (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020), and
(b) to ensure that ToM tasks are not measuring other related but different constructs, such as
fluid and crystallized intelligence. To do this, factor analysis and network modeling will be used
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to assess whether ToM measures adequately represent a ToM construct, and to revise, maintain,
or abandon measures that do not clearly assess ToM.
Second, individual differences in ToM performance will be examined to explore the
processes underlying ToM. To this end, ToM performance and the processes that predict ToM
performance will be studied among adult bilingual and monolingual populations. This will add to
existing theories within both the Performance and Competence frameworks. Specifically, if
bilinguals show that metalinguistic awareness (in addition to EF) can be used to predict ToM
performance for the bilingual group, this would suggest that experience plays a role in the
performance of ToM (supporting the Competence framework). Simultaneously, if monolinguals
largely use EF, but not metalinguistic awareness, to engage ToM, then it would suggest that EF
is also necessary for ToM performance. In other words, studying bilinguals could bridge both
existing theoretical frameworks by showing the extent to which both frameworks can explain
performance based on individual differences. Addressing both of these issues is a crucial step to
further the field of ToM and to understand how humans decipher what other people think and
believe.

II.

Study 1: Psychometric Analysis of Theory of Mind Tasks

The goal of Study 1 is to examine the validity of ToM tasks by comparing performance
on these tasks to measures of fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) (Cattell,
1963). As mentioned, Gf and Gc are reliable constructs that predict a number of real-life
outcomes and that represent related but different psychological attributes. Examining the
differences between these constructs and ToM would allow us to explore whether the processes
tapped by ToM tasks represent a unique ToM construct, or whether they instead measure other
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related constructs. Recent research has reported that some measures of ToM reveal low inter-task
correlations (Warnell & Redcay, 2019), suggesting that different tasks do not measure the same
higher-order construct, but rather reflect task-specific processes (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). For
example, some ToM tasks require reading ability (e.g., Short Stories Questionnaire), while others
require solving novel problems (e.g., Director Task). For this reason, it is necessary to
understand whether these diverse tasks adequately assess the same underlying construct or
whether they are actually measuring other abilities, such as Gf and Gc. For this purpose,
participants completed a battery of ToM, Gc, and Gf tasks. If ToM tasks represent a distinct
cognitive ability, then a three-factor model should best fit the data.
In addition, a psychometric network modeling analysis was conducted to examine the
relationship among ToM, Gc, and Gf tasks. Psychometric network modeling conceptualizes
cognitive abilities as interconnected networks composed of interactive processes (see Epskamp
& Fried, 2018). This approach has many benefits. Specifically, psychometric networks are a
powerful visualization tool to explore anticipated or unknown relationships amongst variables in
a dataset and, unlike latent variable modeling, they are not constrained by the principle of local
independence (i.e., the assumption that a latent factor causes any and all covariation among
measures of the same construct). In addition, network modeling can account for the one-to-one
relationships amongst tasks belonging to the same construct while at the same time estimating
individual relationships between tasks belonging to different constructs. Finally, network
modeling can estimate and plot associations between all observed variables, allowing
investigators to describe and model current theories of ToM.
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iii.

Method

d. Design and Participants
An online sample of 208 participants was recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). The number of participants is based on the minimum sample size required for a threefactor Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). The
inclusion criteria for the study were that all participants had to be based in the US and were over
18. Their ages ranged from 18 to 69 years old (M = 39.89; SD = 9.34, Median = 39). 116
participants identified as female. In terms of ethnicity, 148 participants identified as Caucasian,
13 identified as Black/African, 9 identified as Asian, 3 identified as Hispanic/Latino, and 7
identified as mixed ethnicity. None reported being color blind. In addition, all participants
reported having correct-to-normal vision and were fluent in English. Only one person reported
that English was not their native language. 13 participants reported speaking a language in
addition to English fluently. The final sample size after outliers were removed was N = 203 2.
The design of the study was a correlational approach using two different psychometric
modeling techniques. To conduct factor analyses, it is recommended that each latent construct
includes at least three tasks. In this study, participants completed 9 tasks in total: 3 tasks of ToM,
3 tasks of Gf, and 3 tasks of Gc. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the tasks in
one of three different orders. In order 1 (n =74), participants first completed the Gf tasks (Letter
series, Number series, Ravens), followed by the Gc tasks (Synonyms, Antonyms, and General
Knowledge) and by the ToM tasks (Director Task, RMET, SSQ). In order 2 (n = 58), participants

2

Outliers are defined in the Data Cleaning section.
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first completed the ToM tasks followed by the Gf and Gc tasks. In order 3 (n = 76), participants
first completed the Gc tasks followed by the ToM and Gf tasks.

e. Measures
Theory of Mind Tasks
Reliability for all tasks was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha. Three ToM tasks were
used to assess the ToM construct. Even though traditional studies assume that ToM tasks tap into
the same ToM construct, Warnell and Redcay (2019) found that the tasks vary substantially,
even in terms of face validity. Therefore, it is important to investigate their construct validity.
The ToM measures that were used in the study involve (a) taking the perspective of another
person (i.e., Director task), (b) inferring mental states from people’s eyes (i.e., Reading the Mind
in the Eyes), and (c) interpreting socially inappropriate situations (Short Stories Questionnaire).
See Appendices A-B for a sample of ToM tasks.
Director Task (Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore, 2010; Legg, E. W., Olivier, L.,
Samuel, S., Lurz, R., & Clayton, N. S., 2017). The task was proposed by Keysar, Lin, and Barr
(2003) and automated by Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010. The current version was an
automated version adapted from Legg et al. (2017) and run on Qualtrics. The task includes two
conditions (Director, No Director) and 2 trial types (Experimental, Control). The stimuli are set
up in a 4x4 shelf containing eight different objects arranged in different positions. In the Director
Condition, an avatar called the Director is placed behind the shelf. Some of the compartments in
the shelf are occluded from the Director’s view so that only the participant can see those objects.
The Director stands on the other side of the shelf and views the shelf from behind, so that only
the objects in the open compartments are visible to the Director. The participant is then asked to
attend to the instructions that the Director gives her in a speech box. On each trial, the Director
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asks the participant to select one of the objects in the shelf (e.g., “the yellow sock”, “the small
cup”). The participant responds by clicking on the correct object within the shelf. Participants
have 5 seconds to respond to each instruction. Average accuracy and reaction times for all trials
was recorded.
Conditions. In the Director condition, participants were asked to consider the perspective
of the Director. To this end, participants were shown the shelf from the perspective of the
director and were explicitly told that the Director cannot see objects in the occluded
compartments. This condition assesses theory of mind because the participant has to remember
that the perspective of the Director is not the same as theirs. In the No Director condition,
participants are shown the same shelf, but the Director is not behind it anymore. Instead,
participants are given a strategy; participants are told to ignore all objects placed in the slots with
red backgrounds. This condition does not require theory of mind and instead requires the
participant to inhibit prepotent information while keeping in mind a rule, therefore just requiring
general executive function. The No Director condition is used as a control condition.

Trial types. Experimental trials are trials where the participant have to take into account
the perspective of the Director. Participants have to select the correct response (i.e., the target),
which is an object in the grid that both the participant and the director can see (the tennis ball in
Appendix A), however in experimental trials the shelf also shows a competing object that can be
the most appropriate response but only from the perspective of the participant (the golf ball in
Appendix A-C). To respond correctly, participants have to consider the Director’s perspective
and avoid clicking on the competing object that is only visible to them. In Control trials, the
target object has a competitor but is always the best response from both perspectives and no
competing object is included in one of the grey compartments (see Appendix A-C). Filler trials
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referred to objects in the shelf that have no competitor and are visible to both Director and
participant. The No Director condition included the same three type of trials. Different shelf
displays or stimuli were created for the study. Each stimulus included three instructions, one of
which was either an experimental or control, and two of them were filler trials. Experimental and
control trials are never shown in the same stimulus. Control and experimental trials appear in a
pseudorandom intermixed order throughout the task and the order of presentation of the stimuli
is counterbalanced across participants. There are three written instructions per stimulus that were
presented on a speech bubble near de Director (in the Director condition) or on the top right side
of the shelf (in the No Director condition). Participants respond to a total of 16 control trials, 16
experimental trials and 64 filler trials in each condition. Participants also complete a practice
trials before the Director condition.
Reading the Eyes in the Mind (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, &
Plumb, 2001). The original paper based RMET task was programmed on Qualtrics. In the task,
participants are presented with a series of 36 black and white photographs of the eye region of
the face of White females and males of different ages (see Appendix B). One photograph is
presented at a time and participants have no time limit to respond. Four words describing the
potential emotion conveyed by the eyes are presented together with the photograph. Participants
must select the word that best describes what the person in the photograph is feeling (e.g., sad,
happy, scared, depressed). The test is thought to assess how well a person can understand other
people’s mental states. RMET scores range from 0 to 36 in a discrete fashion. Accuracy is
measured in this task. The task lasts approximately 10 minutes.

Short Stories Questionnaire (SSQ; Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013;
Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2004). SSQ was implemented on Qualtrics. The test
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contains 10 short stories, each divided into three sections. The stories involve utterances made by
a character that could upset another character in the story (e.g., by incorrectly assuming
someone’s age). In this task, participants must infer the mental states of the characters (i.e., how
they felt, what they thought). Because each story is divided into three sections, there are a total of
30 sections overall with at least four utterances in each section. 10 sections contained blatant
target utterances (e.g., incorrectly estimating that a woman’s age), 10 contained subtle target
utterances (e.g., lying about remembering someone’s name) and 10 contained filler control
utterances (e.g., discussing the weather). Each section contained a corresponding question. The
question asked the participant whether something said in the story could have upset someone.
Participants had to judge whether the section contained an upsetting utterance and indicate what
part of the text corresponded to the upsetting utterance. Each of the 10 stories included a filler
question (i.e., a story that did not contain an upsetting question). The order of presentation of the
stories is random. Participants are scored based on the number of targets identified. There are 10
stories, with three parts each and two of the three parts included either a blatant or subtle target
utterance, resulting in 20 possible correct responses. Accuracy is measured in this task. Scores
range from 0 to 20 in a discrete fashion. The task lasts approximately 15 minutes.

Fluid Intelligence Tasks
All fluid intelligence tasks were programmed in Qualtrics. The tasks are thought to
measure the ability to follow rules and solve novel problems.
Letter Series (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). In the task, ten sets of
four letters are presented. All sets present 5 series of letters that followed a certain pattern except
for one set. To respond correctly, participants must select the letter set that does not follow the
pattern. Accuracy is measured in this task. The task automatically ends after 5 minutes.
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Number Series (Thurstone, 1938). In the task, ten trials are presented showing a series
of numbers of varying lengths in it. Each series of numbers is organized following a specific
order or pattern. Participants are asked to select the number that would be consistent with the
series from five choices. Accuracy is measured in this task. The task automatically ends after 5
minutes.
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1938). A short version of Raven’s figural
inductive reasoning task was used to measure fluid intelligence. All items are divided into the
even or odd items for a total 18 items per task from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Set II
(Hamel & Schmittmann, 2006). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two task orders
(odd trials or even trials). In this task, each item is part of a pattern of eight black and white
figures arranged in a 3x3 matrix in which the last bottom right figure is missing. At the bottom of
the matrix is a list of eight possible figures to choose from. Only one of those figures is the
correct answer that best completes the pattern of the missing piece in the matrix. Figures range
from simpler geometrical shapes to complex patterns. In each item there are a series of rules that
the participant needs to find and keep in mind to find the right answer. Participants were given
three practice trials before completing the task. A standardized score of correct responses is
calculated. The task ends automatically after 15 minutes.
Crystallized Intelligence tasks
The crystallized intelligence tasks are programmed in Qualtrics. All tasks are thought to measure
previously acquired knowledge.
Synonyms. The synonyms test presented participants with 10 words shown one at a time
each with a list of possible answer choices. Participants had to choose the word whose meaning
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was the same as the initial word displayed on the screen. Accuracy is measured in this task.
Participants had 5 minutes to answer all 10 questions.
Antonyms. The antonyms test is identical to the Synonyms test, except that participants
have to choose from the list of options the word that represents the opposite meaning to the word
displayed. Accuracy is measured in this task. Participants have 5 minutes to answer all 10
questions.
General Knowledge. The general knowledge test consisted of 10 questions regarding
general knowledge (e.g., “What planet is furthest from the sun?”). Participants have to type out
their answers to respond and are asked to enter “I don’t know” if they do not know the answer.
Accuracy is measured in this task. Participants have 5 minutes to answer all questions.

f. Procedure
All tasks were administered via Qualtrics and participants accessed the study from
Amazon’s MTurk. Participants were assigned to one of three counterbalanced orders following
an unbalanced Latin square design. Each order was counterbalanced based on the construct that
the tasks measure (i.e., Gf, Gc, and ToM). That is, participants were randomly assigned to first
complete the tasks of one of the three constructs, then completed the tasks of the second
construct, and finally the tasks of the third construct., in a counterbalanced order. Tasks within
each construct were presented always in the same order. Participants were allowed breaks in
between tasks. Completing the battery of tasks takes approximately 90 minutes. Participants
were compensated with $15.
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iv.

Results

Descriptive statistics for each measure and reliability estimates are presented in Table 1.
Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of scale reliability, was used to measure the internal consistency of
the tasks in this study. All measures demonstrated adequate reliability according to Cronbach’s
alpha (i.e., 𝛼 ≥ .60). In terms of the relationships among tasks, bivariate correlations between
measures are reported in Table 2. As previous research has shown (Coyle et al., 2018; Warnell &
Redcay, 2019), correlations among ToM tasks were low and all were more correlated with
measures of Gf than with each other. In terms of Gc and Gf, the measures were overall
moderately or strongly correlated. Letter series, number series and Ravens all presented
correlations over r = .30 among themselves; general knowledge, synonyms, and antonyms were
strongly correlated r > .40. Gc and Gf measures were also correlated as expected based on
models of intelligence. Overall, Gc and Gf measures seemed to correlate adequately within their
respective constructs. However, the ToM measures presented less clustered correlations. For
example, the director task and SSQ presented low but significant correlations with all tasks, not
just with ToM tasks, and the RMET seemed strongly related to the Gf measures in particular. To
better understand these relationships, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses.

g. Data Cleaning
Missing Data and Outliers. The data were screened for missing values and outliers. The
analysis indicated that only .05% of the data was missing. The missing data were mainly due to a
technical issue in the Letter Series task that resulted in the loss of 16 responses. Values for the
missing data were imputed using a multiple imputation-chained equation technique (via the mice
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package in R; Azur et al., 2011) that uses Bayesian regression-based linear prediction to impute
all of the missing data points.
Regarding outliers, univariate outliers were deemed negligible as the number of
univariate outliers represented .04% of the data. Multivariate outliers were identified by
generating Mahalanobis distance terms for each case (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In total, 5
cases were identified as having a Mahalanobis distance greater than the associated critical value,
(e.g., 𝜒 2 (31) = 61.09) and were deleted list-wise.
Normality. Univariate and multivariate normality were assessed by examining skewness
and kurtosis values and conducting several tests designed to assess multivariate normality. Prior
to data imputation, no measures in the original dataset demonstrated violations to univariate
normality due to extreme values of skewness (more extreme than ±3.00) and kurtosis (more
extreme than ±10.00), as presented in Table 1. However, the multivariate normality assumption
was violated, based on various tests (e.g., Mardia, Henze-Zirkler, Royston, and Zhou-Shao; see
Alpu & Yuksek, 2016; Zhou & Shao, 2014). Following data imputation, multivariate normality
was still not demonstrated across the multivariate normality tests used (all ps < .05), indicating
that the data were largely non-multivariate normal. For this reason, factor analyses were
conducted using an estimator adequate for non-normal data (i.e., robust maximum likelihood).
Homoscedasticity and Multicollinearity. Breusch-Pagan tests were conducted on the
cleaned data, indicating that the residual variances were homoscedastic (SSQ: BP = 8.3853, df =
6,p-value = 0.2112 RMET: BP = 8.684, df = 6, p-value = 0.1921; DT: BP = BP = 7.0446, df =
6, p-value = 0.3167). Finally, for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all of
the variables were less than 5, indicating that the assumption has been maintained (James et al.,
2014).

39

h. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis is a technique used to test and estimate relationships among
observed and unobserved variables to construct a measurement model. The measurement model
can be used to assess whether tests that assess a construct are consistent with the theoretical
definition of the construct of interest. To examine whether a construct is adequately being
measured, the fit of the model to the data can be tested. The measurement model tests whether
the observed variance-covariance matrix is equal to the variance-covariance matrix implied by
the model. To decide whether a model fits the data, multiple fit indices are observed. Fit indices
consider the fit of the model relative to the saturated model (where all relations are specified) or
the null model (where no relations are specified). According to Kline (2015), adequate models
should have a chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio lower than 2, a Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
greater or equal to .90, a Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) lower or equal to
.08, and a Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) between .05 and .10 (Kline,
2015). In addition, factor loadings should also be observed; cognitive tests tend to present
loading values of between .30 and .60. When several models are being compared, model
comparison indicates whether the models are significantly different, indicating that one of the
models represents the data more adequately.
In this study, CFA was used to assess the construct validity of the tasks by comparing
model fit and loading paths. CFA requires the use of an estimation algorithm to compare iterated
sets of values with the goal of minimizing the difference between the observed and the implied
correlation matrix. Robust maximum likelihood is an adequate estimator for data that present
multivariate nonnormality (Gibson & Ninness, 2005). Data from 203 participants were used.
Three models were specified. The first model, Model 1, was a one-factor model where all
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manifest variables were predicted by a single general construct. Model fit indices are in Table 3.
Generally, Model 1 presented poor fit based on Kline’s fit indices described above, with no
indices within standard ranges. While the fit indices presented a poor model, the standardized
factor loadings were overall adequate, with only Raven’s Progressive Matrices presenting
loadings under .30 (see Figure 2). This indicates that, as expected, a model with a single factor
does not adequately represent the ability that the measures are thought to assess.
Model 2 was conducted next to examine whether the ToM tasks would be better
represented by a Gf factor compared to a separate factor. Model 2 was a two-factor model where
Gf and Gc were the latent factors. The tasks corresponding to the traditional ToM and Gf
constructs were combined in this model based on their bivariate correlations. The reasoning
behind this was to understand whether ToM tasks really do represent an independent construct or
if they are rather more related to tasks of fluid reasoning. Model 2 originally presented a
Heywood case, indicating a misestimation of the model. To avoid this issue and understand
whether the ToM tasks adequately loaded into the latent factor, a model with only Gf and Gc
(i.e., the classical two-factor model) was estimated and the estimates for each variable were used
to constrain the Gf and Gc variables in Model 2. This avoided the emergence of a Heywood case
and provided a more adequate representation of the ToM measures. Fit indices for Model 2 are in
Table 3. Overall, Model 2 did not present an excellent fit based on Kline’s fit indices, and no
indices were within standard ranges, however some of the indices were close to excellent fit.
Compared to Model 1, Model 2 presented better CFI, RMSEA, and chi-square to degrees of
freedom ratio but slightly worse SRMR, while still outside the optimal range. Standardized
factor loadings in Model 2 were adequate for the Gc and Gf factors, even though the ToM
measures were loaded into the Gf factor. The correlation between Gf and Gc was strong, as it is
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usually found (see Figure 3). These findings seem to indicate that although a two-factor solution
was not a perfect fit for the data, nevertheless Model 2 seemed overall better than Model 1 and
was not a complete misrepresentation of the data. Model comparison between Model 1 and
Model 2 revealed that there was no significant difference between Model 1 and Model 2 (X2 = 78.34, p = >.10).
Finally, Model 3 was conducted to examine whether a theoretically-driven three-factor
model provided a more adequate representation of the data. Model 3 was a three-factor model
where each set of tasks was grouped under the psychological construct they represent
theoretically. Just like for Model 2, Gf and Gc tasks were constrained to the estimates reported in
the model with only Gf and Gc to avoid a Heywood case. Fit indices for Model 3 are in Table 3.
Contrary to what was expected, Model 3 did not present an adequate fit to the data based on fit
indices. In fact, Model 3’s fit indices were largely similar to those reported for Model 2, or
slightly worse. Compare to Model 1, Model 3 overall presented overall a better fit. However, no
indices were within adequate ranges. The factor loadings presented strong paths for Gf and Gc
latent factors. However, the factor loadings for the ToM factor were poor (see Figure 4). None of
them present loadings over .30 (see Figure 4). Model comparison between Model 2 and Model 3
revealed that there was no significant difference between the models and there was also no
significant difference between Model 3 and Model 1 (X2 = -75.19, p = >.10). One reason why the
model presented poor fit might be due to the weak correlations among ToM tasks. Unlike the Gc
and Gf tasks, the ToM tasks all presented poor loading paths and the correlations between the
ToM factor and both the Gc and Gf factors showed correlations above 1, suggesting that perhaps
the tasks in the ToM factor might have overlapping variance with some of the tasks in the other
factors. This was further explored by examining modification indices (see Modified Model).
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In general, none of the models presented excellent fit according to the fit indices. Overall,
the two-factor model (in Figure 3) presented the most adequate indices, however there was no
difference with the other models. Model 3 had slightly worse fit indices than the two-factor
model but was not significantly different from Model 2.

i. Exploratory factor analysis
Given the poor fit of the models, we decided to conduct an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) to understand whether the data were indeed a good representation of the measurement
model constructed in the CFAs. A parallel analysis was conducted to determine the number of
factors that should be retained from the data. Parallel analysis is a method to determine the
number of factors that the data form when conducting EFA. The analysis creates a random
dataset with the same number of observations and variables as the original data and eigenvalues
are computed for the randomly created dataset. Then, the randomly generated eigenvalues are
compared to the observed eigenvalues. Because the random eigenvalues mostly represent
random noise, only those factors that fall outside the random eigenvalues are considered real and
are retained. The parallel analysis indicated that 2 factors should be retained (see Figure 5),
rather than 3. This indicates that the third factor is likely so small that it is little more than
random noise. However, to obtain a more interpretable EFA, we decided to follow the theoretical
framework and extract three factors from the data, corresponding to the three psychological
constructs. Because the data were not normal, the chosen estimator was weighted least squares
and the rotation estimator was Oblimin3, given the correlations among the variables. We

3

Extraction techniques produce factors that are orthogonal and atheoretical. Rotation allows the
transformation of the factor loadings, so they become more interpretable. Oblimin is an oblique (as opposed to
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specified 3 factors in a factor analysis on all 9 measures. The results of the EFA are in Table 4.
All variables with loadings greater than .30 were considered to load on a given factor. The results
showed that all measures of Gc loaded adequately under the same factor. However, the Director
task and RMET loaded under the Gf factor with the rest of the Gf measures, whereas the SSQ
was almost entirely loading on the third factor by itself. These results suggest that in this sample,
the ToM measures do not form a single construct, and the tasks seem to be measuring abilities
closer to fluid reasoning, rather than a separate ToM construct. Given the results of the EFA, we
decided to conduct an exploratory network model to better understand the relationships among
measures.

j. Network Model Analysis
Exploratory Network Model Analysis (NMA) is an alternative analysis that
conceptualizes cognitive abilities as interconnected networks composed of interactive processes
(see Epskamp & Fried, 2018). In this technique, observed manifest variables are represented by
nodes and estimated partial correlations amongst them are modeled via connections called edges.
Therefore, this technique does not need the assumption of a superordinate unobservable factor.
NMA can be used in conjunction or as an alternative to latent variable modeling and it presents a
number of benefits. For example, because of its exploratory nature, NMA can be used as a
powerful visualization tool to explore anticipated or unknown relationships amongst variables in
a dataset. NMA is also not constrained by the principle of local independence. Unlike NMA,
CFA is constrained by the principle of local independence. The principle of local independence

orthogonal) extraction technique, therefore it allows the factors to be correlated (which is often the case in
psychological studies).
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assumes that a latent factor causes any and all covariation among measures of the same
construct, and therefore CFA does not allow to observe the variance that manifest variables
potentially have in common. Instead, NMA estimates associations between observed variables
without assuming that a latent cause is responsible for any and all covariation among measures
of the same construct. For this reason, NMA can account for one-to-one relationships among
nodes belonging to the same construct while at the same time estimating individual relationships
between nodes belonging to different constructs. Finally, NMA estimates associations between
all observed variables, therefore it is ideal for modeling cognitive theories that propose
overlapping processes among processes within the same construct. In addition, since NMA is an
exploratory technique, it can be used on the same data as the CFA.
In this study, NMA was used to examine whether tasks that assess ToM are adequately
related to other ToM tasks and only slightly related to tasks that measure Gf and Gc. In addition,
NMA was used to observe the relation between ToM tasks and Gf and Gc tasks to estimate the
extent to which ToM relies on crystallized and fluid processes. For that purpose, tasks for all
three constructs (i.e., ToM, Gf, and Gc) were included in the analysis and the parameters were
set to the indices mentioned above. Data from the same 203 participants was used in this
exploratory method. Based on the findings above and on previous research (Quesque & Rossetti,
2020), it was predicted that ToM tasks that do not meet mentalizing and nonemerging criteria
such as SSQ, would present weak edges and would be more dispersed than tasks that meet these
criteria. In addition, it was predicted that tasks that share construct validity would be more
closely related, independently of the construct they assess theoretically.
NMA was conducted on the correlation matrix extracted from the dataset. The model was
conducted and visualized using the qgraph package in R. The method and techniques used in this
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study are consistent with recommendations from the network modeling tutorial written by
Epskamp and Fried (2018). To conduct an NMA, two parameters must be set. Gamma is a
hyperparameter that determines whether the model favors a more simple or complex structure
per the number of estimated edges. Lambda is a tuning parameter that determines the
rigorousness of removal of identified spurious edges that occur due to sample error. The NMA
was generated using the graphical least absolute shrinkage and selector operator (gLASSO)
regularization method to determine the level of network sparsity. Specifically, the extended BIC
method was utilized, which produces simpler models, as gamma is automatically set to its most
conservative setting (= .50). Consistent with Epskamp, Lunansky, Tio, and Borsboom (2018),
lambda was be set to remove spurious (false-positive) edges while at the same time maintaining
as many true edges as possible (i.e., .01). The settings used for the network model are designed
to facilitate high-specificity during the estimation process, and high-sensitivity regarding
network edge-pruning.
Figure 6 shows the results of the network model. First, both Gf and Gc measures show
strong partial correlations and form two closely related but independent constructs. One of the
tasks, Raven’s, seems to have an especially central position in regard to the correlations among
all three psychological constructs. While the Gf and Gc cluster together, the ToM tasks do not
seem to represent a strong unified cluster. Even though the ToM tasks seemed to form a
relatively solid construct in the CFA, in the NM they are visually less related to each other than
the tasks that form the other constructs. In fact, they seem more related to other non-ToM tasks.
Specifically, SSQ is slightly more related (.17) to Raven’s Progressive Matrices than it is to
either of the other ToM tasks (.1 and .06, respectively). In addition, the Director task and the
RMET do not share any significant edges with each other, despite loading adequately on the
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ToM latent factor in the CFA and on the EFA, suggesting that the relationship between the two
measures that were observed in the EFA might be due to their relationship with Raven’s. In
addition, RMET seems to be more closely related to all the Gf tasks than to any other task,
clustering with the Gf construct, rather than with the ToM construct, following the findings of
the EFA. Overall, the ToM tasks do not seem to form a uniform construct separate from Gf and
Gc, and rather seem to share processes with the tasks belonging to the other constructs than with
each other.
In general, the results of the NMA show that these three ToM tasks are not as strongly
related to each other as previously thought, thus questioning the overall construct that these
measures assess. In addition, these findings replicate recent findings suggesting that there is little
coherence among ToM tasks (Warnell & Redcay, 2019). Although the ToM tasks used in this
study might be tapping on to some dimension of a ToM construct, these findings suggest that
there are clear differences in the processes the tasks are assessing and that they are possibly
measuring other cognitive abilities (such as Gf), rather than or in addition to just ToM. This
indicates that more psychometric research is necessary to understand what tasks should be used
to assess ToM in adults, but also to understand whether ToM should be interpreted as an
independent monolithic construct, rather than a number of sub-constructs.

k. Modified Model
In addition to the above results, an additional CFA was conducted to examine the reasons
behind the lack of fit in Model 3. For this purpose, modification indices were observed.
Modification indices are estimates of the amount by which the chi-square value of a given model
would be reduced, and therefore fit increased, if a specific parameter were modified in the
model. That is, modification indices allow researchers to understand the ways in which the
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model fit could improve based on a data-driven approach. Because of this, it is not advisable to
use modification indices to specify a model a priori, but rather to examine potential issues in the
existing model a posteriori.
To better understand the issues behind the misfit of Model 3, modification indices were
observed. As it was also inferred from the EFA and NMA, the modification indices suggested
that the fit of the model would improve if the RMET would be predicted by both Gf and ToM.
These two modifications would considerably improve the fit of the model (see Figure 7). These
modifications also improved the manifest variables loadings of the ToM latent factor, suggesting
that the RMET is contributing variance to both constructs and therefore its use as a measure of
purely ToM is dubious.

v.

Discussion

The goal of Study 1 was to explore the psychometric properties of ToM tasks compared
to fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) (Cattell, 1963). As previous research
has indicated, the ToM measures were poorly correlated (Warnell & Redcay, 2019), but
presented adequate reliability. The CFA showed that none of the measurement models presented
excellent fit. Specifically, Model 2 (the two-factor model with a Gf-ToM latent factor and a Gc
latent factor) presented similar or better fit indices and path loadings than Model 3 (the model
with Gf, Gc, and ToM), however they were not significantly different. These findings suggest
that the tasks used to measure ToM might be more related to Gf tasks than to each other. In fact,
the modified CFA model showed that the RMET shares processes with Gf and that a model
where RMET was predicted by the ToM and Gf factors improved model fit. This was further
confirmed by the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in which the RMET and the Director task
loaded under the Gf factor, whereas the SSQ loaded separately, indicating that the ToM tasks
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tested here do not represent a unified construct. Finally, the NMA presented a visual description
of the tasks. Specifically, the network model showed that measures of the well-established Gc
and Gf constructs presented strong edges among the corresponding tasks (with weaker edges
among the Gc tasks, representing the constructs’ relationship) and overall clustered together.
However, the edges of the ToM measures were weak, and the nodes were spatially closer to the
Gf tasks (especially Raven’s), than to each other. Specifically, the RMET seemed related to all
Gf tasks but only presented a weak edge with the SSQ, and no edge with the director task.
Similarly, the director task shared weak edges with measures of Gc and with the SSQ but not
with the RMET, whereas SSQ presented weak edges with both ToM tasks and with Raven’s.
Overall, these findings suggest that in this sample of neurotypical adults, three of the most
popular measures of ToM do not seem to reliably measure the same underlying construct.

III.

Study 2: Examination of Processes that Predict ToM
Performance

The goal of Study 2 was to compare ToM performance in bilingual and monolingual
adults to test if the processes underlying ToM vary between groups. This study has potential to
inform existing theories within both the Performance and Competence frameworks of ToM.
Specifically, if bilinguals show that metalinguistic awareness (in addition to EF) is used to
perform ToM tasks, this could suggest that experience-related processes play a role in the
development of ToM (Competence framework). Similarly, if monolinguals largely rely on EF,
with little to no influence of metalinguistic awareness, to complete ToM tasks, then it would
suggest that, in addition to experience, EF is a key predictor of ToM performance. In other
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words, studying bilinguals could bridge both existing theoretical frameworks by showing the
extent to which both frameworks can explain ToM performance based on individual differences.

vi.

Method

l. Design and Participants
An online sample of 186 participants was recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk), 80 bilinguals and 106 monolinguals. The inclusion criteria for bilingual participants
were that they were Spanish-English bilinguals, that they learned and used both of their
languages before age 10, and that at the time of this study, they used both languages on a daily or
weekly basis. The inclusion criteria for monolingual participants were that they only know
English at a native level and have little knowledge of a second language. The total number of
participants recruited was based on an a priori power analysis conducted in G*Power to
determine the minimum sample size needed for a multiple regression analysis to have a 90%
chance of detecting an increase in R2 for a fixed model. The analysis indicated that a minimum
of N = 202 participants (n=100) is needed for the study. All participants were based in the US.
The monolingual group had a mean age of 37.52 (SD = 8.75, Median = 36.5) and the bilinguals
had a mean age of 39.62 (SD = 12.75, Median = 37). 49 monolinguals and 38 bilinguals
identified as female. None reported being color blind and all participants reported having correctto-normal vision. All other demographic information is in Table 5a. The final sample size after
outliers were removed 4 was N = 154, with 92 monolinguals and 62 bilinguals. The study is a
correlational design where all participants completed a ToM task, an executive function task, and

4

Outliers were determined based on the analyses conducted in the Data cleaning setion.
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a metalinguistic awareness task composed of two subtests. In addition, all participants completed
a survey including questions about their language use, culture(s) they identified with, and codeswitching habits, among other demographic information (see Tables 5a-5f). Participants were
compensated $10.

m. Measures
Theory of Mind
Due to the existing discussion regarding the validity of ToM measures (Quesque &
Rossetti, 2020), in Study 2 the Director task was selected to assess ToM, as it is considered to
assess both the mentalizing and nonemerging aspects of ToM (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). In
addition, the Director task was the only task that diverged from the Gf and Gc constructs in
Study 1. The Director task is also thought to assess the perspective-taking component of ToM,
rather than perceptual or emotional dimensions of ToM. This perspective-taking dimension has
also been largely studied in adult non-clinical populations (e.g., Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, &
Blakemore, 2010; Ferguson & Cane, 2017; Pile, Haller, Hiu, & Lau, 2017; Samuel, RoehrBrackin, Jelbert, & Clayton, 2019). For this reason, the same Director task described in Study 1
was used for Study 2. Task reliability was calculated by randomly splitting the observations in
half and calculating Cronbach’s alpha for each half of the dataset. Overall, reliability measured
by Cronbach’s alpha of internal consistency was 1.01.

Metalinguistic Awareness
Metalinguistic awareness was measured using the tasks developed by Cartwright et al.
(2017) for adult samples. The tasks assess the contributions of metalinguistic awareness and
cognitive flexibility. The two measures of metalinguistic awareness correspond to non-semantic
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aspects of cognitive flexibility and are thought to assess the relative contributions of particular
aspects of metalinguistic awareness and cognitive flexibility to differences between good and
poor comprehenders. The overall reliability of the metalinguistic awareness measure was
calculated using Cronbach’s alpha for both of the subtests. Overall reliability was .73.

Graphophonemic awareness. The task consists of a 30-item Phoneme Counting
Questionnaire in which participants have to count the phonemes in printed words (e.g., filth
contains four phonemes). As mentioned above, Cronbach’s alpha is a scale of internal
consistency among tasks. Standardized item reliability based on Cronbach’s alpha for this task
was .87.

Syntactic awareness. This task consists of a 10-item word order correction task in which
participants must reorder sets of words into syntactically appropriate sentences. Multiple
solutions are possible for each set of words (e.g., “the words dog is small the timid” could be
reordered as “The timid dog is small” and “The small dog is timid”). Scores are the total number
of appropriate sentences generated across the ten sets of words. Standardized item reliability
based on Cronbach’s alpha reliability for this task was .87.
Executive function
Executive function allows the control of intentions and goals, while simultaneously
avoiding interference. It is particularly relevant for a number of tasks, as it allows us to avoid
automatic processes that create a conflict between a task and our own intentions. In Study 2,
executive function was assessed with the Simon task.
Simon task (von Bastian & Souza, 2016). In this version of the Simon task, participants
were presented with a circle on either the right-hand side or the left-hand side of the screen. In
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each trial, participants were presented a fixation crossed for 250 ms followed by the circle.
Participants were asked to press the left arrow key when the circle is green and the right arrow
key when the circle is red. Congruent trials are trials where the green circle appears in the left
side and the red circle appears on the right side (75% of trials) and incongruent trials are trials
where the green circle appears in the right side and red circles appear on the left side (25% of
trials). To ensure sufficient inhibitory control demands, only 25% of trials were incongruent
(Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Participants responded to 200 trials. Accuracy and reaction time
responses were recorded. Task reliability was calculated by randomly splitting the observations
in half and calculating Cronbach’s alpha for each half of the dataset. Overall alpha reliability was
.97.
Verbal Ability
Semantic Verbal Fluency (Binetti et al., 1996). The same semantic verbal fluency task
used in Study 1 was used to measure bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ verbal fluency. The task was
modified for the bilingual group, so that it included four categories in Spanish in addition to the
four categories in English (e.g., furniture, fruit, clothing, and animals). Presentation of categories
was counterbalanced within each language and the order of language presentation was also be
counterbalanced. Task reliability was calculated by randomly splitting the observations in half
and calculating Cronbach’s alpha for each half of the dataset. Overall alpha reliability was 1.03.
Bilingual Background
Participants completed a survey regarding participants’ demographics, language history
and use. The survey was composed of three well established questionnaires: Language
Experience and Proficiency Questionnaire (Marian, Blumenfeld, & Kaushanskaya, 2007), the
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Language and Social Background Questionnaire, and the Bilingual Switching Questionnaire
(Rodriguez-Fornells et al., 2012).

n. Procedure
All tasks were administered via Qualtrics and participants had access to the study from
Amazon’s MTurk. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four counterbalanced orders to
complete the three tasks and the questionnaire. The questionnaire was always the last item to
complete, whereas the other tasks were counterbalanced for both monolinguals and bilinguals.
The entire study took between 50-60 minutes to complete.

vii. Results
Descriptive statistics for each measure and reliability estimates are presented in Table 6. The
metalinguistic test demonstrated adequate internal consistency according to Cronbach’s alpha
(i.e., 𝛼 ≥ .60). In terms of the relationships among tasks, bivariate correlations between measures
are reported in Table 7.

o. Data Cleaning
Missing Data and Outliers. The data were screened for missing values and outliers. This
analysis indicated that there was no missing data. Regarding outliers, multivariate outliers were
given priority as they are of greater concern than the less complex univariate outliers.
Multivariate outliers were identified by generating Mahalanobis distance terms for each case
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In total, 14 cases were identified as having a Mahalanobis distance
greater than the associated critical value, (e.g., 𝜒 2 (31) = 61.09) and were deleted list-wise. After
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removal of the multivariate outliers, univariate outliers were deemed negligible as the number of
univariate outliers represented .09% of the data. Thus, no other cases were removed.

Normality. Univariate and multivariate normality were assessed by examining skewness
and kurtosis values and conducting several tests designed to assess multivariate normality (see
Figure 8). Prior to data imputation, no measures in the original dataset demonstrated violations to
univariate normality due to extreme values of skewness (more extreme than ±3) and kurtosis
(more extreme than ±10), as presented in Table 6. However, multivariate normality was not
demonstrated based multivariate normality tests (e.g., Mardia, Henze-Zirkler, Royston, and
Zhou-Shao; see Alpu & Yuksek, 2016; Zhou & Shao, 2014). Following data imputation,
multivariate normality was still not demonstrated across the multivariate normality tests used (all
ps < .05), indicating that the data were largely non-multivariate normal.

Homoscedasticity and Multicollinearity. Breusch-Pagan tests were conducted on the
cleaned data, indicating that the residual variances were not homoscedastic 5 ( 𝐵𝑃 =
30.255, 𝑑𝑓 = 4, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = < .001). Finally, for multicollinearity, the variance inflation
factors (VIFs) for all of the variables were less than 5, indicating that the assumption was
maintained (James et al., 2014). The violation of the homoscedasticity assumption was further
examination by examining the histogram of the director task. The histogram revealed a bimodal
distribution. For this reason, director task accuracy was divided using a median into a binary

5

It is likely that the homoscedasticity assumption was violated due to a floor effect in responses to
experimental trials from the bilingual group. As mentioned in the results section of Study 2, the data collected for
the bilingual group were likely flawed due to reasons outside the design of the study.
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variable. Therefore, a binary logistic regression was conducted to examine individual
differences.

p. Group-level analyses
The main goal of the study was to examine individual differences in ToM between
bilingual and monolingual adults. However, before conducting individual differences analyses,
group-level analyses for each of the predictor variables were conducted to explore differences
among the experimental conditions of each of the tasks as well as differences between bilinguals
and monolinguals. Specifically, group-level analyses were conducted to ensure that the
experimental manipulations in each task were successful. First, analyses were conducted to
compare differences in accuracy based on trial type (experimental vs. control trials), condition
(director vs. no director condition), and language group (bilingual vs. monolingual) in the
director task with the goal of examining whether participants responded less accurately to critical
trials in the director condition as well as whether there were differences by language group.
Second, accuracy and reaction time were measured in the Simon task to explore whether there
was a congruency effect (i.e., difference in responses based on congruent vs. incongruent trials)
and whether responses varied by language group. Third, responses to both of the metalinguistic
tests were compared for each language group to examine potential differences in accurate
responses. Finally, responses to the Verbal Fluency tasks were analyzed to determine a) whether
there were differences in verbal fluency in English for each language group and b) whether there
were differences between English and Spanish verbal fluency for the bilingual participants.
Director task
Responses to the director task were examined to explore differences in responses between
bilinguals and monolinguals for experimental compared to control trials for each condition. A 2
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(trial type: experimental, control) x 2 (language group: bilingual, monolingual) x 2 (condition:
director, no director) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on response accuracy. The threeway interaction was not significant, F(1, 153) = .26, p = >.1, ηp2 = .100 (see Figure 9). However,
there was a group by trial type interaction, F(1, 153) = 74.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .33; bilingual
participants responded less accurately to experimental than control trials (bilingual: M = .23, SD
= .35; monolingual: M = .74, SD = .37). There was also a significant condition by trial type
interaction F(1, 153) = 39.46 p < .001, ηp2 = .21; participants responded less accurately to
experimental compared to control trials in the Director but not in the No Director condition
(bilingual: M = .45, SD = .43; monolingual: M = .61, SD = .44). These findings show that
participants made fewer mistakes when they had to select items that both the participant and the
director could see (i.e., control items) than when they had to select items that only the
participant, but not the director, could see (i.e., experimental items). However, this only occurred
when the participants completed the task in which they had to take the perspective of the director
(i.e., Director condition) compared to when they merely had to follow a rule (i.e., No director
condition). In addition, bilinguals seemed to largely underperform in experimental trials
compared to control trials across both conditions, indicating that they largely responded
inaccurately to items that the director could not see compared to monolinguals.
Simon task
Responses to the Simon task were examined to explore differences in responses between
bilinguals and monolinguals for congruent compared to incongruent trials. To analyze responses
to the Simon task (N = 154), the data were divided into two datasets based on reaction time and
accuracy. Reaction time (RT) responses were filtered so that only correct responses were
included. RT and accuracy each followed the same cleaning process described in the Method.
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Both datasets were aggregated to obtain a mean RT and accuracy score per participant per
condition (i.e., congruent, incongruent). Then, only participants with complete trials for both RT
and accuracy were included. The total number of participants after this process was N = 144 for
accuracy and N = 146 for RT.
First, a 2 (trial type: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (language group: bilingual, monolingual)
mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on RTs (see Figure 10). The predicted interaction was
not significant, F(1, 146) = .51, p > .10, ηp2 = .003. However, there was a significant main effect
of group, F(1, 146) = 17.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .12; bilingual participants had longer RTs than
monolinguals (bilingual: M = 733.41 s, SD = 269.97; monolingual: M = 575.40 s, SD = 154.85)
(see Figure 10). In addition, as predicted, there was a significant main effect of trial type, F(1,
146) = 133.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .48; participants had shorter RTs when responding to congruent
than incongruent trials (incongruent: M = 658.76, SD = 221.74; congruent: M = 625.42, SD =
227.23).

Next, a 2 (trial type: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (language group: bilingual, monolingual)
mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on accuracy (see Figure 10). Again, the predicted
significant interaction was not significant, F(1, 145) = .41, p > .10, ηp2 = .002. However, in the
accuracy measure, there seemed to be a ceiling effect which might be responsible for the
nonsignificant interaction. As predicted, there was a main effect of trial type, F(1, 145) = 9.48, p
< .001, ηp2 = .39; participants were more accurate when responding to congruent than
incongruent trials (incongruent: M = .94 SD = .05; congruent: M = .98, SD = .03). The main
effect of group was not significant.
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Overall, the results showed that there was a congruency effect; all participants were more
accurate and had shorter RTs when responding to congruent trials compared to incongruent. In
addition, bilinguals again underperformed in this task, presenting longer RTs than monolinguals.
Metalinguistic task
Responses to the metalinguistic tasks were analyzed to examine differences in responses
between bilinguals and monolinguals for each subtest. Analyses were conducted for each of the
two metalinguistic subtests to examine any potential differences between bilinguals and
monolinguals’ performance. For this, two t-tests were conducted on the Graphophonemic and
Syntactic Awareness tests. For responses to the Graphophonemic task, Levene’s test showed that
homogeneity of variance was not violated. An independent samples t-test indicated that there
was a significant difference between responses of bilinguals and monolinguals, t(215.93) = 5.82, p < .001, d = -.72. Specifically, monolinguals more accurately identified number of
phonemes than bilinguals (bilinguals: M = 10.23, SD = 7.62, monolinguals: M = 15.32, SD =
6.81) in the Graphophonemic test (Figure 11). Next, Levene’s test showed that homogeneity of
variance was not violated in the Syntactic Awareness test either. Another independent samples ttest was then conducted on the total number of correct responses to the Syntactic Awareness
test6. There was a significant difference between responses of bilinguals and monolinguals,
t(237.43) = -8.81, p < .001, d = -1.05. Specifically, monolinguals provided more grammatical
sentences than bilinguals (bilinguals: M = 6.43, SD = 4.22, monolinguals: M = 10.86, SD =
4.24) in the Syntactic Awareness test (Figure 11). Together, these results suggest that bilinguals
largely underperformed in both tests of metalinguistic awareness.

6
As a reminder, the Syntactic Awareness test was open-ended, that is, participants could create as many
grammatically correct sentences as possible. The Graphophonemic test had a range of 0-30 correct responses.
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Verbal Fluency
Verbal fluency was reported to assess whether there were implicit differences in verbal
ability between bilinguals and monolinguals, as well as differences in Spanish and English in the
bilingual group. Responses to the verbal fluency task were averaged and examined in two
subsequent analyses. The first analysis compares average verbal fluency in English for both
bilinguals and monolinguals and the second test examines verbal fluency in Spanish compared to
English for the bilingual participants. For this, two separate t-tests were conducted. In the first ttest comparing English verbal fluency of bilinguals to monolinguals, Levene’s test showed that
homogeneity of variance was violated, therefore a Mann-Whitney U test for nonnormal
independent samples was conducted. There was a significant difference such that monolinguals
outperformed bilinguals in the average number of words provided, U = 4820, p < .001, d = 1.05, indicating that monolinguals obtained a significantly higher score than bilinguals
(monolinguals: M = 12.83, SD = 4.02, monolinguals: M = 8.23, SD = 5.23) in the English verbal
fluency test (Figure 12). Next, another Levene’s test showed that homogeneity of variance was
also violated when comparing verbal fluency in Spanish among bilinguals. Another MannWhitney U test was conducted on the average verbal fluency score in English and Spanish. There
was a significant difference between bilinguals’ responses in English and Spanish, U =9540, p <
.001, d = .87. Specifically, bilinguals on average provided more correct words in English than in
Spanish (English: M = 8.23, SD = 5.23, Spanish: M = 4.49, SD = 3.32) (Figure 12). These
findings follow the same pattern of results reported for the other tasks above, suggesting that this
group of bilinguals seems to have underperformed overall across all tasks. In addition, the
finding that bilinguals had a substantially low score in Spanish and significantly lower than their
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English score suggests that this group of bilinguals was in reality not composed entirely of
bilinguals.

q. Individual differences analyses
Individual differences were examined next. The main goal of Study 2 was to explore
whether metalinguistic awareness and EF are predictors of ToM, as well as whether bilingualism
moderates their effect on ToM. To test this prediction, regression analyses were conducted with
EF, Metalinguistic Awareness, and Language Group (bilinguals vs. monolinguals) as predictors,
and ToM as the outcome variable (see Table 8 for descriptive statistics). As mentioned above,
the director task (i.e., outcome variable) had a bimodal distribution. Therefore, the data violated
the normality assumption and the homoscedasticity assumption for a traditional multiple
regression. For this reason, responses to the director task were divided using a median split and a
binary outcome variable was created where participants who scored below or equal to the median
(Median = .40625) were assigned a 0 (i.e., incorrect) and participants who scored above the
median were assigned a 1 (i.e., correct). Therefore, a binary logistic regression was used to
analyze the effect of EF, metalinguistic awareness, and bilingualism on ToM. Bivariate
correlations (Table 7) showed that ToM was significantly negatively correlated with RTs in the
Simon task (r = -.37) and positively correlated with both metalinguistics tests (r = .31 and .38,
respectively), thus indicating that it was adequate to perform regression analyses.
Three binary logistic regressions were conducted. To obtain a metalinguistic awareness
score, the two metalinguistic tests were averaged and used as a metalinguistic awareness
composite. Model 1 examined the effect of incongruent RTs in the Simon task and the
metalinguistic composite as continuous variables, and Language group (bilinguals and
monolinguals) as a categorical variable, on the two binary director task outcome. Model 2 was
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identical to Model 1, but it also included the interaction between the Simon task and Language
group and Model 3 was identical to Model 1 but including the interaction between the
metalinguistic composite and Language group. Results for all models are reported in Table 8.
The estimates of Model 1 show that all predictor variables (the Simon task, language
group, and metalinguistic awareness) significantly predicted performance on the director task. As
a reminder, in a binary logistic regression, the estimate B represents the logit (i.e., the log odds).
To make this estimate interpretable, the odds ratios and the probability of obtaining a 1 in the
director task (i.e., the probability of obtaining a score above the median) for each predictor
variable are also reported. The probability estimates suggest that participants with higher
metalinguistic score and slower RTs have about 50% probability of obtaining a 1 (i.e., obtaining
a score above the median) in the director task, and monolinguals have a 90% probability of
obtaining a 1 in the director task. This is in line with the group-level findings that show that
bilinguals underperformed across all tasks in this study. As Models 2 and 3 show, there was not a
significant interaction between the Simon task or the Metalinguistic composite and language
group, suggesting that in this study responses to the director task were not moderated by
bilingualism. Figure 13 presents the results of Models 2 and 3.
The results of the individual differences analyses suggest that (a) bilinguals overall
underperformed in the director task compared to monolinguals and (b) performance in the
director task was overall predicted by performance in the Simon task and metalinguistic tests, as
well as by being bilingual or monolingual. Specifically, slower RTs in the Simon task predicted
more accurate performance in the director task, especially for monolinguals. In the metalinguistic
awareness test, there was also a tendency for participants with higher metalinguistic scores to
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also perform more accurately in the director task. These results are further discussed in the
General Discussion.

viii.

Discussion

The goal of Study 2 was to examine predictors of ToM performance in bilingual and
monolingual adults. Specifically, whether metalinguistic awareness, EF, and bilingualism
predicted ToM performance, as well as whether bilingualism moderated the effect of the other
predictor variables on ToM. At the group-level, monolinguals largely outperformed bilinguals in
all tasks. Importantly, bilinguals performed significantly worse in the verbal fluency task
compared to monolinguals and bilinguals performed worse in the Spanish verbal fluency task
than in the English verbal fluency task, suggesting that the participants in this sample were not
bilinguals and might not have taken the study seriously. At the individual differences level, all
EF, metalinguistic awareness, and bilingualism predicted ToM performance in this study.
However, bilingualism did not significantly moderate the effect of either predictor variable.
These findings are the first to suggest that that metalinguistic awareness and bilingualism are
significant predictors of ToM. However, the disproportionate number of bilinguals who
underperformed in this study suggests that there was a systematic problem with the bilingual
sample recruited in this study. Given that data collection was conducted online, it is possible that
the participants in the study were not in fact bilinguals or that they did not follow the instructions
of the study, hindering the implications of the findings of Study 2.
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IV.

General Discussion

7. Study 1: The need for psychometric research of ToM.
The goal of Study 1 was to examine the psychometric properties of ToM tasks compared
to fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) (Cattell, 1963). As previous research
has shown, ToM measures were poorly correlated (Warnell & Redcay, 2019), nevertheless, they
presented adequate reliability. The confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) showed that none of the
models tested presented excellent fit. Specifically, the two-factor Model 2 (the model with a GfToM latent factor and a Gc latent factor only) presented better fit indices and loadings than the
three-factor Model 3 (the model with Gf, Gc, and ToM latent factors), even though the two
models were not significantly different. These findings suggest that the ToM tasks tested in this
study might be more related to Gf than to a separate construct. This was further confirmed by the
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in which the RMET and the Director task loaded under the GF
factor whereas the SSQ loaded separately, suggesting measurement issues. In addition, the NMA
presented a clearer picture of the relationships among the tasks. Specifically, the network model
showed that, as opposed to the well-established Gc and Gf measures that presented strong edges
and overall clustered together, the ToM measures were only poorly related and closer to the Gf
tasks (especially Raven’s), than to each other. Overall, these findings suggest that, at least in this
non-clinical population of adults, the most popular measures used to test ToM across the
literature do not seem to reliably measure the same underlying construct.
Recently, the director task has been the subject of intense debate. Specifically,
researchers have questioned whether it measures a specific dimension of ToM or rather some
other cognitive processes, such as mental rotation or selective attention (Rubio-Fernandez,
2017). In this study, the director task was poorly related to the other ToM constructs but
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moderately correlated to the Gf and Gc tasks. It is unclear from this study whether the director
task constitutes a better measure of a ToM construct than the other tasks measured in this study.
It is possible that the director task represents a perspective-taking (cognitive), rather than socialcognitive or social-perceptual dimension of ToM, thus correlating more strongly with fluid
reasoning (especially, Raven’s progressive matrices that includes strong mental rotation and
pattern seeking components). For example, research suggests that the SSQ is thought to be a
social-cognitive measure whereas the RMET is thought to better capture social-perceptual ability
(lower-order perceptual responses). Following this, it is possible that the director task represents
yet another aspect of ToM. However, whereas the RMET and SSQ were moderately correlated,
the director task presented poor correlations with the other two ToM tasks. This leaves
unanswered the question of whether the director task represents a specific dimension of ToM that
is only weakly related to other ToM dimensions, or whether instead the RMET and SSQ do not
adequately capture ToM. Another possibility is that the director task does not necessarily
measure a ToM-related ability but a different cognitive process. For example, Rubio-Fernandez
(2017) has proposed that perhaps the director task could instead be measuring selective attention
rather than solely ToM. Specifically, she proposes that the egocentric eye fixations often
observed when participants see the critical items in the director task might not necessarily
represent participants’ egocentric fixations, but rather that these eye fixations might indicate that
participants are instead using selective attention to discard the inappropriate item that hinders the
listener’s ability to carry out an action. This question is still unclear and requires further
experimental research.
In general, these findings indicate that there are systematic issues around the
conceptualization of ToM. Shaafsma et al. (2015) have pointed out that the use of ToM has been
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“vague and inconsistent” across the literature and that there are deep inconsistences in the
research, both related to the reliability of the measures and the claims made via the use of these
measures in experimental designs. As discussed in the introduction, there are a number of
different levels in which ToM is conceptualized and described, and different terminology is used
to refer to the same construct; cognitive development, social cognition, self-understanding,
perception of others, understanding logical inferences, emotion and/or empathy all seem to be
included in the same umbrella term of ToM. However, it is unlikely that all these different
aspects of cognition assess the same cognitive construct. As an example, in intelligence research,
it is often thought that general intelligence encompasses a number of specialized sub-abilities
(see Figure 14) whose positive correlations (i.e., positive manifold) represent a general
intelligence construct. For each of these sub-abilities, a number of reliable tests (ideally at least
three) are necessary to measure each sub-construct’s validly and reliably. It is possible that ToM
can form a similar construct with different but related sub-abilities (as suggested by Quesque &
Rossetti, 2020). However, for this to be explored, researchers should take a step back and
develop reliable and valid tests of each proposed sub-ability that they consider forms a ToM
ability. In addition, this should be further examined and described for the different populations in
which ToM is studied: clinical and healthy, adults and children. Only by conducting this
important psychometric work would we be able to reconcile developmental, clinical, cognitive
and neurological research on ToM.

8. Study 2: Individual Differences in ToM
The goal of Study 2 was to examine any differences in the processes that predict ToM
performance in bilingual and monolingual adults. Specifically, the goal of Study 2 was to assess
(a) whether being bilingual moderated the effect of metalinguistic awareness on ToM, and (b)
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whether being monolingual moderated the effect of EF on ToM. Overall, the initial hypothesis
was not supported. Monolinguals outperformed bilinguals in all the tasks. In addition, whereas
EF, metalinguistic awareness, and bilingualism all predicted ToM performance in the individual
differences analyses, bilingualism did not significantly moderate the effect of any predictor
variable. It is worth noting that there was a disproportionate number of bilinguals who
underperformed in the ToM task as well as the verbal fluency task. In addition, bilinguals
performed worse in the Spanish verbal fluency task than in the English verbal fluency task. This
indicates that there was likely a systematic problem with the bilingual sample recruited in this
study. Due to the lack of control of the participants who completed the study online, it is possible
that the bilingual participants were largely not bilinguals. In the raw data of the bilingual group,
there was number of unreliable responses and fake responses (i.e., bot-generated responses),
suggesting that non-human participants might have infiltrated the study. These issues overall
compromise the implications of the findings of Study 2.
A positive outcome of this study is the high reliability observed among the metalinguistic
tasks (Cartwright et al., 2017). There are not many metalinguistic tasks available for adult
samples, therefore confirming the reliability of these tests allows for further research on the
relationship of metalinguistic awareness and other cognitive abilities among adults.
Metalinguistic awareness was also strongly correlated with executive function and performance
in the director task in this study, suggesting that overall metalinguistic awareness is likely a
relevant cognitive ability, even if it was not a moderating factor in this study. More studies
examining individual differences in ToM should include a metalinguistic awareness task in
addition to executive function measures.
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Overall, Study 2 did not support the hypothesis that metalinguistic awareness is a
stronger moderator than executive function in bilinguals compared to monolinguals. This
provides support for the performance framework of ToM as opposed to the competence
framework of ToM. Proponents of the performance view suggest that developing a more
complex executive function alone is what allows children and, later, adults to successfully
perform ToM tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Leslie, 1994; Leslie,
German, & Polizzi, 2005; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Both metalinguistic awareness and EF are
cognitive abilities that are developed in childhood and that improve throughout the lifespan, and
both were significant predictors of ToM. This indicates that there are likely a number of
cognitive abilities needed to complete ToM tasks and one’s individual ability in each of these
tasks will affect performance in ToM. However, these findings should be interpreted with
caution due to the issues mentioned above.
Overall, Study 2 cannot shed light on the mechanisms that influence ToM performance.
In addition to the issues related to the bilingual data, the implications of Study 1 suggest that it is
necessary to understand what we are truly observing when we measure “ToM” before drawing
inferences from experimental and correlational studies. The director task used in this study could
represent perspective-taking, social-cognitive ability, selective attention, or just fluid reasoning.
Given the low correlations among the ToM measures in general, tests and tasks should be better
unified before examining individual differences in ToM if we want to have a better
understanding of what influences this ability or abilities.

9. General Discussion
Overall, this dissertation poses a number of questions that warrant further study.
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1. Is there one ToM or are there independent emotional, perceptual and/or cognitive processes
underlying a ToM? Schaafsma et al. (2015) have posed the same question. The researchers raise
the issue of what really constitutes an example of ToM. According to the researchers, the current
conceptualization of ToM cannot be reduced to a number of basic processes and they wonder
whether such a differentiated ability really exists: it “requires faith that there is indeed something
distinctive about the core concept of ToM”. As the researchers point out, neurological research
has proposed that there are computational features (i.e.., domain-general) as well as contentspecific features (i.e., domain-specific) that relate to people’s ability to understand desires,
intentions, and beliefs. Content-specific features need to be inherently social whereas
computational features refer to the specific differentiated processes involved in this ability, such
as decoupling, recursion, prediction, and causal inference (Schaafsma et al., 2015). Further,
Quesque and Rossetti (2020) have proposed that there are likely several separate mechanisms
that have been crammed under the term ToM. Specifically, they propose that the long list of
tasks used to measure ToM correspond to different processes. For example, the RMET might
assess “Facial Expression Categorization”, the SSQ could be a task of “Mental States
Ascription” and so on. To answer the question posed above, it is necessary that ToM measures
reflect both general and specific computational processes used when one interprets desires,
intentions, and beliefs in social contexts. Until this is achieved, it is not clear whether the field
can move forward.
2. Are there individual differences in ToM performance? Can different subcomponents of ToM
vary across individuals? Given the many similarities and relationship between ToM and other
cognitive abilities, it is likely that ToM varies across individuals based on different factors, and it
is also likely that the level of one’s ToM ability can predict other life events. However, because
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the formal conceptualization of the construct is so poor, it is not possible at this point to
investigate such individual differences. While some research has looked into how ToM ability
can vary across the lifespan (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), it is not clear what
these differences represent and whether they are accurate reflections of individual differences in
ToM or, instead, of other related and/or overarching cognitive ability (e.g., EF).
In essence, this dissertation leaves more questions than answers, clearly reflecting the
unstable state of the area of ToM research. These questions emphasize the need for a paradigm
shift in ToM research where the theoretical research conducted to date is re-examined, the
measurement and psychometric research revisited and improved, and the field is unified by
taking into account the number of processes that are unique, as well as similar, to other wellestablished concepts.
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Appendices
ix.

Appendix A

Director task (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). During the instructions phase,
subjects were shown an example of their view (a) and the corresponding Director’s view (b) for a
given trial. During the experiment phase, subjects could encounter experimental trials (c) or
control trials (d). Participants had to follow the oral instruction given by the Director. In
experimental trials (c), the participant should move the target item (tennis ball) and ignore the
distractor item (golf ball) if they took account of the Director’s perspective. In control trials, an
irrelevant object was shown instead of the distractor. Reprinted with Permission.
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x.

Appendix B

Sample Reading the Eyes in the Mind (RMET). Participants view the eye region of different
faces and indicated the emotion that the eyes convey from four possible options.
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xi.

Appendix C

Sample section of the SSQ. Stories were adapted to American English and implemented in
Qualtrics. Participants had to decide whether a statement was socially awkward.
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xii.

Appendix D.

Counterbalancing analyses for Study 1 and Study 2.

Study 1

Additional analyses were conducted to examine whether there were differences task
performance based on the order in which the tasks were presented. As mentioned in the Method
section, the tasks were administered in one of three random orders. Order 1 was the following:
Gf tasks, Gc tasks, ToM tasks. Order 2 was: ToM, Gf, Gc. Order 3 was: Gc, ToM, Gf. To
simplify counterbalancing analyses, only one task per construct (i.e., the first task of each set of
three tasks presented) was tested. Therefore, three three-way ANOVAs were conducted to
examine differences in responses to each task for each order.

The first ANOVA compared accuracy in the Letter Series task of Gf across all three
orders. There were no significant differences across orders (F (2, 200) = 1.63, p = >.10). The
second ANOVA compared total responses to the Synonyms task of Gc across all three orders.
There were no significant differences across orders (F (2, 200) = .73, p = >.10). The last
ANOVA compared accuracy in experimental trials of the director task of ToM across order.
There were no significant differences across orders (F (2, 200) = .20, p = >.10); the order in
which participants completed the tasks did not affect performance in Study 1.
Study 2
Three additional analyses were conducted to examine whether there were differences in
responses to the tasks based on the order in which the tasks were presented. As mentioned in the
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Method section, the tasks were administered in one of four random orders. Order 1 was the
following: director task, Simon task, verbal fluency, and metalinguistic tests. Order 2 was:
Simon task, verbal fluency, metalinguistic tests, director task. Order 3 was: Verbal fluency,
metalinguistic tests, director task, Simon task. Order 4 was: metalinguistic tests, director task,
Simon task, verbal fluency. Four four-way ANOVA were conducted to examine differences in
responses to each task for each order.
The first ANOVA compared accurate responses to the experimental trials of the director
task across all four orders. The ANOVA reported a significant effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 5.71,
p = .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the significant differences were between
Order 4 and Order 2 (p = .005) and Order 4 and Order 3. (p = .001) indicating that participants
performed more accurately when they were assigned to Order 4 compared to Orders 3 and 2.
There were no other significant difference across orders for the director task.
The second ANOVA compared reaction times for incongruent trials of the Simon task
across all four orders. The ANOVA reported a significant effect of Order (F (3, 152) = 3.52, p =
.017). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the significant difference was between Order
2 and Order 1 (p = .016), indicating that participants performed more accurately when they were
assigned to Order 2 compared to Orders 1. There were no other significant differences across
orders for the Simon task.
The third and fourth ANOVA compared responses to the Graphophonemic and syntactic
awareness tests, respectively. The ANOVA for the Graphophonemic test showed a significant
effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 12.31, p = < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the
significant difference was between Orders 3 and Order 1 (p = <.001), Order 4 and Order 2 (p =
.002) and Order 4 and Order 3 (p = <.001). The ANOVA for the syntactic awareness test showed
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a significant effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 3.58, p = < .014). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
showed that the significant difference was between Order 4 and Order 2 (p = .008).
The last ANOVA compared responses to the verbal fluency task in English across all
orders. The ANOVA showed a significant effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 6.77, p = < .001). Posthoc pairwise comparisons showed that the significant difference was between Orders 2 and
Order 1 (p = .014), Orders 3 and 1 (p = < .001), and Order 4 and 3 (p = .015).
Overall, the results of the counterbalancing analyses do not present a specific pattern of
bias in one specific order, even though all ANOVA showed a significant difference in at least
one order pairwise comparison. The Order that seems most problematic across all ANOVA is
Order 4.
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Tables
a) Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics for Study 1.

Variables

Latent
Construct

M

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

9.28

3.84

-.89

-.78

Range

𝜶

1. Ravens
Progressive
Matrices
2. Letter Series

RV

LS

203

6.77

2.59

.05

-.40

0-10

.77

3. Number
Series

NS

203

9.40

3.07

-.26

-.61

0-15

.85

4. General
Knowledge
5. Synonyms
Task
6. Antonyms
Task

GK

203

7.09

2.26

-.99

.34

0-10

.79

Crystallized
intelligence
(Gc)

203

5.99

2.52

-.63

-.33

0-10

.86

203

6.16

2.15

-.48

-.68

0-10

.85

Theory of
Mind
(ToM)

203

.59

.39

-.48

-1.61

0-1

.66

203

30.1
4

4.02

-.92

1.12

0-36

.72

203

10.1
5

3.33

-.20

-.24

0-20

.72

SYN
ANT

7. Director Task

DT

8. Reading the
Eyes in the
Mind
9. Short Stories
Questionnaire

RME

SSQ

Fluid
Reasoning
(Gf)

N

203

.81
0-18
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b) Table 2. Correlations among variables.

Variable
1. General
Knowledge
2. Synonyms
3. Antonyms
4. Letter Series
5. Ravens
6. Number series
7. SSQ
8. RMET
9. Director task

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.50
.43
.17
.52
.39
.18
.33
.16

.66
.19
.38
.33
.15
.32
.16

.18
.44
.34
.15
.32
.16

.36
.49
.16
.30
.18

.56
.33
.41
.32

.14
.39
.27

.24
.18

.17

Note. All correlations were significant at p = <.05

96

c)

Table 3. Model Fit Indices for All CFA Models in Study 1.

Fit Indices

χ2

df

Recommended fit
(Kline, 2015)

x2/ df

CFI (TLI)

RMSEA

SRMR

≦2

≧.90

≦.08

.05 - .10

Model 1:
One predictor

164.19

28

5.86

.73 (.65)

.16

.149

Model 2:
GF + TOM

95.51

32

2.98

.88 (.86)

.09

.157

Model 3:
GF + GC + TOM

108.31

31

3.49

.85 (.83)

.11

.175

Network model

21.46

11

1.95

.98(.92)

.068

.033

Note. It is common that the Network model presents excellent fit, nevertheless, because the network model is an
exploratory analysis, it is not possible to directly compare it to the CFAs.
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d) Table 4. Exploratory Factor Analysis Loadings for 3 factors. Tasks that loaded at >.30 were considered to
load onto the same factor.

Tasks

Factor 1 - Gc

Factor 2 - Gf

1. Letter Series

.60

2. Ravens

.55

3. Number Series

.87

4. Synonyms

.82

5. Antonyms

.81

6. General
Knowledge

.49

7. Director Task

Factor 3 - ToM

.31

8. SSQ

.84

9. RMET

.31
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e) Table 5a. Demographic information for bilinguals and monolinguals.
Group
Bilingual

Monolingual

Level of
Education
Doctorate
Master
Bachelor
Some college,
no degree
Associate
degree
High school
or equivalent

Education
Frequency
1
36
33
5

Reported
Culture
US-American
Hispanic
Mexican
Asian

Culture 1
Frequency
34
4
9
1

Culture 2
Frequency
6
9
4
3

4

Black/African
American
European

1

2

Catholic
NativeAmerican
White/
Caucasian
Other
Jewish
Non-Hispanic

3
1

2

Master

9

Bachelor

34

Some college,
no degree
Associate
degree
High school
or equivalent
Less than
High School

28
17
17
1

Culture 3
Frequency
1
3
2
1

1

12

3

3
2
2

2
1
1
1

81

3
4

Black/African
American
Asian

5

2

3

2

White/
Caucasian
European

8

1

3

8

2

MexicanAmerican
Catholic
Hispanic
Other

2

1
2

1
2

Spanish
US-American

6

7

1

Note. Frequencies represent the number of participants who indicated a specific educational level or culture
identification. Participants entered manually the culture or cultures they identified with. The maximum number of
cultures reported were 3.
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f)

Table 5b. Bilinguals’ self-reported L1 (dominant) and L2 (nondominant).

L1

L2

English

81

2

Spanish

1

63
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g) Table 5c. Bilinguals’ reported age of acquisition (AOA) of each language and years living in a country
where each language is spoken.

Mean AOA L1
(SD)

Mean AOA L2
(SD)

Years in L1 country

Years in L2 country

1.64 (1.78)

5.21 (4.3)

32.21 (17.62)

23.29 (18.66)
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h) Table 5d. Bilinguals’ reported languages spoken across their lifespan.

0-2 years 3-4 years
English
Spanish

49
17

54
19

5-10
years
50
32

11-13
years
57
23

102

14-17
years
51
35

18-21
years
61
29

+22
years
59
28

i)

Table 5e. Bilinguals’ average time using L1 and L2 by social group (%). Means (SD) are reported.

Friends

Family

L1 71.69 (21.07) 70.41(22.09)

Coworkers

School

Religious events

69.59 (26.72) 70.79 (27.01) 63 (30.57)

L2 50.89 (27.56) 54.02 (23.03) 49.2 (30.66)

48.17 (30.12) 48.85 (30.45)
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Leisure
71.09 (25.41)
51.05 (30.94)

j)

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for measures in Study 2, reported separately for bilingual and monolingual
subjects.

Variables
Graphophonemic
task
B Syntactic
awareness
Verbal Fluency
(English)
Simon Task (RT)

M

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Range

𝜶

N
62

10.26

7.54

.57

-.80

0-30

.87

62

6.26

4.17

.92

.67

0-20

.87

Verbal Ability

62

8.30

5.02

.52

-.20

0-20

1

Executive
Function

62

729.15

269.64

1.51

2.13

382-1683

.97

62

.16

.29

1.91

2.07

0-1

1

92

15.32

6.81

-.52

-.37

0-30

.87

92

10.86

4.24

.21

-.54

2-23

.87

Verbal Ability

92

12.95

3.91

-.22

.94

1-25

1

Executive
Function

92

575.40

154.85

1.98

5.05

373-1298

.97

92

.66

.33

-1.99

3.77

0-1

1

Construct
Metalinguistic
Awareness

Director Task
ToM
Graphophonemic
task
Syntactic
M awareness
Verbal Fluency
(English)
Simon Task

Metalinguistic
Awareness

Director Task
ToM

Note. Task reliability for the metalinguistic awareness tests was calculated by extracting Cronbach’s alpha from the
two tests. Task reliability for all other tasks was calculated by extracting Cronbach’s alpha from the split in half
dataset.
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k) Table 7. Correlation matrix among variables in Study 2.

Variables

1

2

3

4

1. Verbal Fluency
2. Director Task

.47

3. Graphophonemic
task
4. Syntactic Awareness
task
5. Simon task

.60

.50

.52

.46

.54

-.47

-.38

-.30

Note. All correlations were significant at p <.05.
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-.43

l)

Table 8. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Models 1-3, N=146).

Model 1
B

SE

β

Odds
ratio

P

Simon task

-.003

.001

-2.28*

.996

.50

Metalinguistic
Composite

.203

.051

4.03***

1.25

.55

Language Group

2.25

.528

4.27***

9.51

.90

Variable

Pseudo-R2

-.708
Model 2
B

SE

β

Odds
ratio

P

-.002

.003

-1.27

.997

.499

Metalinguistic
Composite

.21

.051

4.06***

1.23

.551

Language Group

3.68

2.15

1.71᛭

39.74

.975

Simon task x Group

-.002

.003

-.69

.997

.499

Variable
Simon task

Pseudo-R2

-.714
Model 3
B

SE

β

Odds
ratio

P

Simon task

-.003

.001

-2.27*

.996

.499

Metalinguistic
Composite

.205

.081

2.50*

1.23

.551

Language Group

2.28

1.38

1.66᛭

9.84

.908

Metalinguistic x
Group

-.002

.103

-.027

.997

.499

Variable

Pseudo-R2

-.708

Note: *** <.001, ** <.01, *<.05, ᛭ <.1. P = probability.
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Figures

a)

Figure 1. Plotted bivariate correlations and histograms for all tasks in Study 1.
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b) Figure 2. Model 1: One-factor model. Standardized factor loadings are presented. All loadings were within
adequate range (>.30) with the exception of Raven’s. ANT = Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN =
General Knowledge, DT = Director task, SSQ = Short stories questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in
the mind test, NUM = Number series, LET = Letter series, RAV = Raven’s progressive matrices.

108

c)

Figure 3. Model 2: Two-factor model. Standardized factor loadings are presented. All loadings were within
adequate range (>.30). ANT = Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = General Knowledge, DT = Director
task, SSQ = Short stories questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in the mind test, NUM = Number series,
LET = Letter series, RAV = Raven’s progressive matrices.
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d) Figure 4. Model 3: Three-factor model. Standardized factor loadings are presented. Loadings were within
adequate range for the Gc and Gf factors (>.30) but were low for the ToM factor (< .30). ANT =
Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = General Knowledge, DT = Director task, SSQ = Short stories
questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in the mind test, NUM = Number series, LET = Letter series, RAV
= Raven’s progressive matrices.
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e)

Figure 5. Parallel analysis. The black line represents the number of factors extracted from the dataset based
on eigenvalues. The blue line represents the number of random factors retained from the random
eigenvalues. The overlap of the blue and black line at factor 3 suggests that only factor 1 and 2 should be
retained (Adjusted Eigenvalue 1 = 2.74, Adjusted Eigenvalue 2 = .29).
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f) Figure 6. Network model. Nodes represent the tasks measured in the study. Edges represent the partial
correlations among measures. Colors represent the theoretical construct they assess.
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g) Figure 7. CFA model with modification indices (i.e., RMET is predicted by both ToM and Gf). ANT =
Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = General Knowledge, DT = Director task, SSQ = Short stories
questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in the mind test, NUM = Number series, LET = Letter series, RAV
= Raven’s progressive matrices.
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h) Figure 8. Plotted bivariate correlations and histograms for all tasks in Study 2.
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i)

Figure 9. Response accuracy to the Director task by language group, condition, and trial type. The threeway interaction was not significant. There was a group by trial type interaction showing that monolinguals
responded more accurately than bilinguals to experimental trials.
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j)

Figure 10. Response times (ms) to the Simon task by trial type and accuracy (proportion correct) to the
Simon task by trial type.
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k) Figure 11. Total responses to the Graphophonemic test (i.e., correctly identifying words’ phonemes) of
Metalinguistic awareness by language group and total responses to the Syntactic Awareness test
(grammatical sentences) of Metalinguistic awareness by language group.
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l) Figure 12. Average Verbal Fluency score in English by group and Average Verbal Fluency score in
Spanish compared to English for the bilingual group.
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m) Figure 13. Models 1 and 2. Simon task and Metalinguistic awareness predicting the director task by group.
Both predictor variables significantly predicted ToM but there was no moderation based on language
group.
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n) Figure 14. Cattel-Horn-Carrol (CHC) model of general intelligence and it’s sub-abilities (McGrew, 2009).

120

